COMMENT
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND THE THEORY OF
FREE ENTERPRISE
I. INTRODUCTION
EW DEAL legislation and administration in the field of corporate finance and management are too often discussed on the
basis of a general predisposition toward or against "regulation."
While it has often been recognized that the modem corporation is a
central phenomenon in our economy,' there have seldom been attempts
to utilize economic theory, or an analysis of the operation of a competitive, free enterprise system of organization, as an aid in understanding
and evaluating various kinds of regulatory legislation. Such an analysis is
here attempted with respect to some aspects of the administration of the
3
Securities Act of 1933' by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
I See Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1934).
248 Stat. 74 (1933), I5 U.S.C.A. §77a (Supp. 1938).

3To make such an analysis places upon one the obligation of warning the reader of the
assumptions upon which the analysis rests.
It is assumed that the system of sanctions which the Securities Act imposes effectively
insures that persons responsible for the distribution of new securities issues, acting in their
self-interest, will make that disclosure which the Act contemplates. It is the task of another
study, therefore, to determine the policy behind loopholes in the liability provisions.
Even if the assumption be made that the liability provisions are effective to force security
issuers to comply with the substantive provisions of the Act, there is no great certainty that
any particular rule promulgated by the commission in aid of the general language of the substantive provisions represents "the law" with respect to what security issuers must disclose
or the manner in which they must make disclosure. Except in §17 (with whose administration
this note is not concerned), the Act only penalizes non-disclosure or omissions of material
facts (§§ 5, 8, io, ii, 12, 24). Although the facts which those drafting the Act regarded as
"material" to the investor are indicated by the contents of Schedules A and B, it is hardly
thinkable that courts would hold all of the data required by those schedules to be material.
The commission only lays down the broad test that a "material fact" is "a fact" which would
tend "to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question." Matter of Howard et al., i S.E.C. 6, 8, i8 F.T.C. 626, 629 (1934). Even if one overlooks the difficulty of differentiating between answers responsive to items in the forms and answers not so
responsive (cf. Matter of Oklahoma-Texas Trust, Sec. Act Rel. 1563 at ii-x2 (g937), aff'd
ioo F.(2d) 888 (C.C.A. ioth 1939) with Matter of Metropolitan Personal Loan Co., Sec. Act
Rel. 1594 at 3, n.3 (I937)), in construing too few items of the forms promulgated by the commission pursuant to statutory authorization (§ig(a)) has the commission held that failure to
make an answer to an item of a form prina facie constitutes a deficiency (Matter of Nat'l
Boston Montana Mines Corp., 2 S.E.C. 226, 262 (1937); Matter of Bering Straits Tin Mines
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A basic problem of any social organization is ascertainment of what is
the most socially desirable aggregate of material goods and determination
of the mechanism by which this corpus of wealth may be produced and
distributed in a manner most in accord with the general welfare. In its
theoretical formulation of this problem recent Western civilization has
been greatly influenced by economic theory in the tradition of Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations. Proponents of such theory argue that the
mainspring of the action of men in society is economic self-interest or "the
natural effort of every individual to better his own condition" ;4 and that,
if each person in a society is placed in a position which will enable him
freely to pursue his economic self-interest, the result is to "place every
productive resource in that position in the productive system where it can
make the greatest possible addition to the social dividend as measured in
price terms" and "to reward every participant in production by giving it
the increase in the social dividend which its co-operation makes possible ..... ".
5
It is frequently suggested, of course, that actual conditions are widely
Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1498 at 7 (1937); Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1507
at io,n.* (1937); Matter of Old Diamond Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Re]. 1576 at 1-2 (1937);
Matter of Oklahoma-Texas Trust, Sec. Act Rel. 1563 (i937), aff'd ioo F.(2d) 888 (C.C.A.
ioth 1939)), or that failure to present data in the manner called for by the commission's instructions constitutes a deficiency (Matter of Bering Straits Tin Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel.
1498 at 7 (1937); Matter of Ypres Cadillac Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1652 at io-ii (1938);
Matter of Oklahoma Hotel Building Co., Sec. Act Rel. i9oo (1939)), or that failure to include
data not responsive to an item of a form does not constitute a deficiency (Matter of Metropolitan Personal Loan Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1594 at 3, n. 3 (1937); Matter of Queensboro Gold
Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1617 at 4 (i937); Matter of Kinner Airplane and Motor Corp. Ltd.,
Sec. Act Rel. 1644 (i937); Matter of Ypres Cadillac Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1652 at 8-9
(1938); Matter of South Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1694 at 8 (1938); Matter of
United Combustion Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1828 at i, n. i (1938); Matter of Oklahoma Hotel
Building Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1goo (1939); contra: cases cited in notes 133 and 179 infra.) For
there to be any definite assurance that the facts called for by the forms are regarded by the
commission as either indispensable or sufficient for prudent investment. In any event, either
courts or juries will have ultimately to decide what constitutes materiality of misstatement
or omission. In view of the fact, however, that in over five years of litigation only one stoporder proceeding has been reviewed, materiality is as a practical matter an issue for the commission. To make any progress in analysis of the commission's activities, it must be assumed
that the commission's rules have the force of law, and that the ambit of disclosure which the
commission deems essential may be found by analysis of its rules and instructions.
No attempt is here made to offer comprehensive citation of secondary sources. Any effort
to present more than citations to authority of official or semi-official status would be an inadequate duplication of the bibliography recently promulgated by the commission (Bibliography:
Securities and Exchange Commission Library (i937)).
4 Gide and Rist, Histoire des doctrines economiques 86 (2d rev. ed. 1913).
5 Knight, Ethics of Competition 48 (i935).
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divergent from those visualized by such analysis. But it has also been
said that the economic policy formulated by the classical analysis has
never failed because it has never been tried,6 and that the "idea of a
purely individualistic order is a logical device, necessary to separate for
study tendencies of individualism from those of socialism." 7 The reason
for these and similar statements is that in practice the "restraints" upon
the ideal working of the scheme of free enterprise, the removal of which
classical economists agree is a proper'province of government, 8 are fully
as important as the forces actually operating in accord with the theory of
free enterprise.
One such restraint arises from the failure of society to approximate a
condition of perfect mobility of buyers and sellers. The concept of mobility implies perfect knowledge on the part of any buyer or seller of goods
or productive services of facts which would render one course of action of
greater economic benefit to him than any other, and perfect freedom on
the part of any buyer or seller to adopt immediately that most favorable
course of action. Imperfect mobility tends to delay or prevent the flow of
capital into that industry where it will bring the greatest return, and to
delay or prevent the transfer of capital from less efficient to more efficient
business units within an industry. To the extent that these consequences
result, the economic system fails to attain those ends which classical
economic theory deems desirable.
Immobility due to lack of knowledge of persons supplying capital to
business enterprises may result from the failure of such persons to be
cognizant of all knowable facts bearing upon the advisability of investment, or from their failure to be aware of the uncertainties of business
which they assume by entrusting funds to business enterprise. If one is to
invest intelligently, he must differentiate between avoidable uncertainty,
any business risk which is within the power of men to eliminate, and
unavoidable uncertainty, any business hazard which man is powerless to
efface.
The principal aim of the Securities Act is to require that offerors of new
securities issues make available to prospective purchasers knowable facts
bearing upon the advisability of purchasing the securities offered. In addition, the act requires that the issuers give full information regarding unavoidable and avoidable risk to be borne by the purchasers of the securities offered. The inferior quality of information which was available
6Soule, The Coming American Revolution 138 (1934).
Knight, op. cit. supranote 5, at 47.
8 Gide and Rist, op. cit. supra note 4, at 96.
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to prospective investors prior to the Securities Act, 9 and the disastrous
losses which investors suffered in the depression years, 0 dictated the need
of federal legislation to accomplish the aim of adequate disclosure.
II. THE COMMISSION'S VIEW OF THE SCOPE OF ITS POWER
If the Securities Act represents an effort to promote a closer approximation to a free market for investment capital, it would be expected to remove obstacles to intelligent decisions by investors not only by requiring
disclosure of material facts and penalizing misstatements but also by
prohibiting a presentation of accurate information in a form likely to
mislead. That the commission views its quasi-judicial power" under the
Act as a power to give the Act this liberal construction is revealed by its
opinions on a number of questions.
Perhaps the closest of such questions is whether or not a registrant may
include in the answer to an item of the registration statement or in the
prospectus information which, if it has any effect upon the investor, has
the effect of misleading him, provided that the registrant includes in close
juxtaposition information which should enable the average prudent investor to give the misinforming data its true significance. On this issue
the opinions promulgated by the commission are not consistent. On the
one hand, there are strong dicta in Matter of Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate 2 and similar cases' 3 which imply that the province of the commission
is merely to require that all material facts bearing upon the significance
9 See the classic discussion in Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 208-228

(1929).

xo "During the post-war decade some 50 billions of new securities were floated in the United
States. Fully half or $25,coo,ooo,ooo worth of securities floated during this period have been
proved to be worthless." H.R. Rep. 85 at 2 (73d Cong. ist Sess. i933).
"See Securities Act of 1933, § 8.
x2Sec. Act Rel. 1555 at 3 (I937) (valuation by divining rod materially misleading unless
the registrant reveals clearly and without camouflage that the divining instrument is not considered by any recognized authority to be of any use whatsoever in locating oil or other
minerals). Cf. Matter of La Luz Mining Corp., i S.E.C. 217, 218-22 (x935).
X3An outdated mining report may not be included in the registration statement without also
including therein corrections of the report which were necessary in the light of facts which were
known or should have been known between the date of the mining report and the effective
date of the registration statement (Matter of Franco Mining Corp., i S.E.C. 285, 290 (1936);
Matter of Emporia Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 220 (1937); Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines Corp., 2 S.E.C. 226, 261 (1937). Cf. Matter of Mining and Development Corp.,
i S.E.C. 786, 799-804 (1936)). See also Matter of Bering Straits Tin Mines Inc., Sec. Act
Rel. 1498 at 8 (1937) (" .... unless clearly informed to the contrary investors are entitled to
believe that such a figure, [$74,977] on the balance sheet represents cost or 'value' arrived at
by the use of accepted methods of valuation and is not an arbitrary figure."); Matter of
American Kid Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1678 (1938) (an estimate of future profit given in a prospectus
does not meet the requirements of full and adequate disclosure imposed by the Act unless the
doubtful character of its premise is revealed). But more recently, see Accounting Rel. 4 (1938).
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of the registrant's assertion be presented in dose juxtaposition to the
assertion.
In Matter of West Park Apartments'4 this position has attained the
dignity of a holding. The holding, however, is entitled to but slight weight
since the misrepresentation involved was very small, was corrected elsewhere in the registration statement, and was found to be without the
capacity to mislead. A different view, however, is illustrated in the cases
holding an appraisal deficient for failure to follow scientific methods.,,
The whole trend of the latter cases is toward the view that the commission is both to pass upon the truth or falsity of items in the registration
statement and admit into the statement and prospectus only such assertions as convey a true impression of the registrant and of its business condition. The commission has even held, for example, that an opinion
stated by an expert 6 is primafacie deficient if the supposed expert had no
basis for his opinion. 7 These cases are arguably reconcilable with the
Hanson and West Park Apartment cases on the ground that it does not
appear in any of them that the baseless character of the opinion is fully
disclosed in dose juxtaposition to the baseless statement. This argument,
however, can hardly be made with respect to the rule that an indication in
a footnote to a financial statement" or in the accountant's certificate that
an item in the financial statement was not arrived at by use of accepted
accounting principles will not prevent the misleading item from being
deficient.19
It would seem that the latter of the two positions which we have disSec. Act Rel. x8ri at 9 (1938).
xsNote 77 infra.
the commission's concept of the expert see Matter of Gilpin Eureka Consolidated
Mines, I S.E.C. 752, 757 (1936).
x? Matter of Emporia Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 219 (1937).
is The commission has consistently held that an erroneous item in a balance sheet cannot
be corrected by a footnote to the balance sheet (Matter of Mining and Development Corp.,
i S.E.C. 786, 798 (r936); Matter of Yumuri jute Mills, 2 S.E.C. 8, 87 (1937); Matter of
Queensboro Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1617 at 2 (1937)). This conclusion has been reached
even when the item challenged is the title of an account which is not incorrect but which is
merely ambiguous, the footnote being used to remove the ambiguity (Matter of Canusa Gold
Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 6 (I937) (title of account was "Mining Property," footnote
revealed that the property was held under lease and option). But a footnote is properly used
to indicate contingencies on which statements in the balance sheet which are presently true
will be untrue (Matter of Canusa Gold Mines, Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 7 (1937). See Matter
of Bankers Union Life Co., 2 S.E.C. 63, 68 (1937)); or to indicate that a transaction given effect
on the balance sheet may be illegal under state law (Matter of Peterson Engine Co., Inc., Sec.
Act Rel. 1627 at 11-12 (1937)). Cf. Matter of South Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1694
at 6 (x938).
"gAccounting Rel. 4 (1938). This ruling assumes additional significance since the commission formerly held otherwise. See Healy, The Next Step in Accounting, x3 Accounting
Rev. 1,4 (1938).
?4

16 For
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cussed is the more reasonable. The words of the statute do not require the
adoption of the former view; 2 0 and the economic policy of the Securities
Act seems clearly opposed to its adoption; since a baseless opinion or afortiori a flatly false statement, if of any influence upon the investor, must in
most instances misinform him. In any event it has uniformly been ruled
that, if a deficiency in the registration statement or prospectus is material,
it may not be corrected by information in another part of the registration
statement or prospectus2 ' in the absence of permissible cross-reference
between the items.2

Other cases which more dearly suggest that the commission views its
province to be the elimination of anything which may prevent the investor from acting in accord with his economic self interest are those in
which the commission holds that a statement may be deficient, though
3
literally true, because the investor is apt to draw incorrect inferences.2
One group of cases establishing this principle includes those cases in which
the commission uniformly rules that incomplete presentation of a subject
may be materially misleading because an investor who reads a statement
on a given subject may naturally assume that all material facts with
reference to that subject are presented in that statement.' 4 The commis48 Stat. 87 (I933), IS U.S.C.A. § 77w (1938) says nothing to the contrary.
21A misrepresentation or under-estimate of operating cost in a mining report is not cured
by use of the correct value in valuing assets (Matter of Sunset Gold Fields Inc., 2 S.E.C. 329,
335 (1937)). A statement in a mining report that a mine contains a certain number of tons of
1'proven"' ore is deficient when elsewhere in the registration statement facts are revealed showing that the engineer could not have assigned any tonnage to proven ore following the method
of appraisal which he followed (Matter of Emporia Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 216 (1937)).
A statement in large type in a prospectus cannot be corrected by a statement in small-type
even if the latter is made in reasonably close proximity to the former (Matter of Bankers
Union Life Co., 2 S.E.C. 63, 66 (r937); Matter of National Educators Mutual Ass'n, i S.E.C.
2

208, 211 (1935)).
22

Matter of T.I.S. Management Corp. Sec. Act Rel. i689 at 2-6 (1938). See Regulation C,

article 3C, General Rules and Regulations, Sec. Act of 1933 at 47-49 (1938).
2 The source of this doctrine is Rex v. Kylsant, [1932] 1 K.B. 442. This case figured
prominently in the minds of those drafting the Securities Act. See, for example, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314 at ii (73d Cong. xst
Sess. 1933).
24 Matter of Livingston Mining Co., 2 S.E.C. 141, 148 (1937) ("It is misleading merely to
state the few facts about properties that are known, without making it clear that many facts
are unknown, that the records are incomplete, and that part of what has been stated is mere
guess and we so find"); Matter of Hanson Oil Syndicate, Sec. Act Rel. 1555 (I937) (statement
that a "big" oil well had been discovered in the vicinity of property belonging to the registrant
held materially misleading for non-disclosure that the well had begun to produce so% water
and had to be cemented back); Matter of South Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1694
(1938) (answer to item asking for sales of securities to the public within two years preceding
filing of the registration statement held deficient for failure to include all sales); Matter of
Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1776 at I1 (1938) (statement that application for registration
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sion's zeal to hold deficient possibly misleading assertions which are
literally true extends not only to true though incomplete statements, but
to ambiguous statements which are true in only one sense. Consequently,
a bond may not be given a "dollar" value when it is in fact payable threequarters in cash and one-quarter in stock.2s It has even been held, that if a

registrant states at one point that a certain promoter is a mining engineer,
it may not state elsewhere that the promoter has spent a certain period of
time inspecting properties, since the investor may infer that the promoter
was inspecting the properties as a mining engineer when actually he was
inspecting them with a view to their purchase.26 The unexplained use of a
word in a sense other than one generally accepted,27 or the use of a word in
two senses without making graphically clear the shift in meaning,28 also
constitutes a material deficiency.
Other general principles developed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission tend to reinforce the basic position that the commission
views its power as one to eliminate anything with any appreciable tendency to prevent the investor from being fully informed. For example, if
the registrant constantly repeats and stresses a favorable but only slightly
material fact,2 9 an immaterial fact, 30 or a fact whose relevance the regisof securities with a state regulatory body was "withdrawn" or "withdrawn without prejudice'!
held materially misleading because the registrant omitted to state that it was its understanding

that if not withdrawn, the application would be denied). See also Matter of Howard et al.,
I S.E.C. 6, 1o, 18 F.T.C. 626, 632 (1934); Matter of Commonwealth Bond Corp., i S.E.C. 13,
23, i8 F.T.C. 635, 647 (1934); Matter of Avocalon Extension Syndicate Ltd., I S.E.C. 657, 659
(1936). This rule may be applied even though the deficiency appears on the face of the answer
to the item. (Matter of Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1776 at io, n. ig (1938) (statement that
option contract was signed by 14 optionees was deficient in giving neither the names of optionees nor the number of shares optioned)).
25Matter of Bankers Union Life Co., 2 S.E.C. 63, 66 (i937).
6
2 Matter of Platoro Gold Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1807 at 4 (1938).
7Matter of Nat'l Educators Mutual Ass'n, i S.E.C. 2o8, 213 (1935); Matter of Oil Ridge
225, 228 (1935); Matter of American Terminals and Transit
Co., r S.E.C. 7or, 724 (1936); Matter of Livingston Mining Co., 2 S.E.C. 141, ISO (1937);
Matter of Rickard Ramore Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 377, 388 (1937); Matter of Income

Oil and Refining Co., I S.E.C.

Estates of America, 2 S.E.C. 434, 439 (193 7); Matter of West Park Apts. Corp., Sec. Act Rel.
1811 at 6 (1938).
28Matter of Underwriters Group Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1653 at 14 (1938).
29 Matter of Income Estates of America, 2 S.E.C. 434, 443 (i937) (registrant repeatedly

reiterated in the prospectus the name, functions, and long and successful history of a trustee;
this was held materially deficient when the trustee was without discretion in connection with
the investment of the funds in trust and when the registrant was a new and completely unknown corporation).
30See Matter of Emporia Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 220 (1937) (inclusion in prospectus

of true and optimistic account of mining properties located not less than iooo miles from those
of the registrant).
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trant cannot demonstrate; 3" if the registrant separates in the prospectus
facts which would give a less favorable position if placed together; 32 or if

the registrant presents complex facts in a complicated manner in a prospectus directed to the financially uninitiate; 3 the commission may apply
the rule that although no assertion is untrue a registration statement or
prospectus may be found materially deficient because the manner of
presentation is deceptive. 34 Complex presentation of facts in a prospectus
is, in any event, discouraged by the rules as to summarization. 3s
Even with the fullest possible disclosure and the most ample protection
against misleading suggestion, 36 a limbo of uncertainty will necessarily
remain as to the prospects of the enterprise. Here it is important that the
investor be made conscious of the risks involved in the enterprise itself
and of the portion of the risk which he will bear. Such caution is important not only for the purchaser of common stock but also for the purchaser
of bonds. Seldom will specific security or the investment by stockholders
furnish complete protection for bondholders; in most cases, in view of the
limited liability of stockholders, bondholders share the ultimate risk of
the enterprise. Unless they understand the extent to which they are thus
entrepreneurs, they are not in position to weigh the return offered them
3zMatter of Gilpin Eureka Consolidated Mines Inc., i S.E.C. 752, 761 (I936). Cf. Matter
of Natl Invested Savings Corp., i S.E.C. 825, 829 (1936).
32 Matter of Austin Silver Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1774 at 6 (1938).
'3 Matter of Natl Educators Mutual Ass'n, r S.E.C. 208, 2X5 (1935); Matter of Income
Estates of America Inc., 2 S.E.C. 434, 445 (1937).
34 It follows a fortiorithat a deficiency which is immaterial may result in a materially deficient registration statement or prospectus in the event that there are one or more other
deficiencies in the document, any of which taken alone would be immaterial. (Matter of
Nat'l Educators Mutual Ass'n, i S.E.C. 2o8, 215 (1935); Matter of Mutual Industrial Bankers
Inc., r S.E.C. 268 (1936); Matter of Income Estates of America, 2 S.E.C. 434, 442 (i937);
Matter of Austin Silver Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1774 at 6 (1938). Cf. Matter of Metropolitan Personal Loan Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1594 at 7 (1937)).
3S Matter of Underwriters Group Inc.; Sec. Act Rel. 1653 at 12 (1938). Cf. Opinions of the
Director of the Division of Forms and Regulations, Sec. Act Rel. 874 (1936), 1503 (1937),
i58o (1937); Rule 821, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933 at 47 (z938).
36The cases which have been cited in this section all tend to establish the proposition that
in response to any item in a registration form the registrant must avoid placing any statement
in such form that it will tend to mislead. If the registrant volunteers information not called
for by the forms he will be held to this same standard. (Cf. Matter of Treasure Hill Extension
Mines Co., Inc., 2 S.E.C. 134, 138 (1937); Matter of Emporia Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209,
216 (i937); Matter of Paper Sales Co. of Detroit, Sec. Act Rel. i556 at 6 (i937) as amended
by Sec. Act Rel. x665 (1938); Matter of Platoro Gold Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1807 at 7
(1938); a stop order may issue if the information volunteered does not meet this standard (Cf.
Matter of Unity Gold Corp., I S.E.C. 25, 28, i8 F.T.C. 649, 653 (i934); Matter of Commonwealth Bond Corporation, i S.E.C. 13, 18, i8 F.T.C. 635, 643 (1934); Matter of Emporia Gold
Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 216 (1937)).
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against this risk of loss. To the extent that purchasers of securities assume risks inadvisedly, the benefits of a competitive capital market in
directing the allocation of resources into most productive channels will
fail of achievement. The commission, therefore, quite properly takes the
position that "the investor is entitled to know not only the facts which are
established; it is frequently more vital for him to be cautioned that there
3
are areas of information about which there is considerable doubt." 7
To digest the decisions which the commission has rendered requiring
facts reasonably knowable 38 with respect to the business enterprise to be
revealed, would be to deal with the commission's least difficult and least
interesting opinions.39 The remainder of this paper, therefore, is a discussion of those uncertainties inherent in business and the modes of description of the business enterprise which the commission has adopted as best
calculated to bring to light such uncertainties.
III. DISCLOSURE OF UNAVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY
VALUATION OF FIXED ASSETS
The unavoidable uncertainties of business are particularly striking in
the case of enterprises in which investment in fixed assets bulks large, for
fixed plant and equipment is in a large measure irrevocably committed to
the enterprise. Since investment in any fixed asset is usually to be recovered only through the sale of products over the period of the useful life
of the asset, an accurate valuation of the asset would represent its future
contribution to product value discounted to present worth. No business,
however, can make such a valuation because of uncertainty as to the
future demand for its product.4° Consequently, any balance sheet valua37 Matter of Livingston Mining Co., 2 S.E.C. 141, 148 (1937), followed and approved in
Matter of Platoro Gold Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1807 at 5, n. 14 (1938). See also Matter of
West Park Apts. Corp., Sec. Act Rel. i811 at 5 (1938).
38 Except in answering items which only call for information known to the registrant, the

registrant must furnish answers embodying all data which might be known at the effective
date of the registration statement and which was reasonably knowable to the registrant at that
time. Matter of Howard el al., i S.E.C. 6, io, i8 F.T.C. 626, 632 (1934); Matter of Unity
Gold Corp., z S.E.C. 25, 29, 18 F.T.C. 649, 653 (i934); Rule 502, General Rules and Regulations, Sec. Act of 1933 at 36 (1938). That this rule is not appreciably different than the common law test of negligence appears from those numerous cases which hold that good faith is
immaterial on the issue of whether or not a deficiency is present. The law of a jurisdiction in
which the registrant has mining property should reasonably be known to the registrant.
Matter of Oklahoma-Texas Trust, Sec. Act Rel. 1563 at 14 (1937), aff'd ioo F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A.
ioth 1939).
39 See, however, note 77 infra.
40 "The uncertainties which persist as causes of profit are those which are uninsurable
because there is no objective measure of the probability of gain or loss. This is true especially
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tion of a fixed asset must be unsatisfactory since it conceals the risk that
the asset will not be realized at any foreseeable amount.
A. STANDARDIZATION OF CONVENTIONAL MODE OF VALUATION

The most conservative effort of the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with effecting a proper valuation of fixed assets has
been an effort at standardization of the definition of certain concepts used
by accountants to value fixed assets, the purpose of such standardization
being to give fixed asset accounts, in financial statements of different
enterprises in the same and different industries, that degree of comparability in the absence of which the prospects of enterprises competing for
4
free capital cannot intelligently be evaluated. '
of the prediction of demand. It not only cannot be foreseen accurately, but there is no basis
for saying that the probability of its being of one sort rather than another is of a certain value.
Situations in regard to which business judgment must be exercised do not repeat themselves
with sufficient conformity to type to make possible a computation of probability." Knight,
Distribution: The Pricing of Productive Services Individually, Syllabus for the University of
Chicago Second Year Course in the Study of Contemporary Society 224, 249 (1934).
4' The commission has the power to prescribe uniform systems of accounts, uniform modes
of valuation, and uniform forms of financial statements. 48 Stat. go8 (i934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s
(Supp. 1938). The textual discussion is concerned only with the commission's use of this power
to standardize the modes of valuing fixed assets and income. Seepp.419-20infra. Comparison
of the forms of financial statement promulgated by the commission would doubtless reveal
extensive standardization of the arrangement of financial statements and of the accounts included in financial statements. It would be found, for example, that unless trade practice is
to the contrary no asset is a current asset unless it is realizable within a year from the date of
the balance sheet in which the asset is set forth (Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 31 (1937));
and that the registrant may not denominate as paid-in surplus any amount in excess of
the difference between the par or stated value of the registrant's stock and the consideration
which the registrant has received for its stock (Instruction 22, Financial Statement Instruction
Set No. x, Form E-i at 49 (1937); Instruction 22, Instructions Relative to Balance Sheets of the
Issuer, Form A-i at 32 (1937)). Any steps which the commission has taken to effect standardization of accounting principles to be employed by persons registering securities under the
Securities and Securities Exchange Acts, are less far-reaching than the standardizations which
the commission has effected pursuant to powers granted by the Public Utility Holding Company Act. See Uniform System of Accounts for Mutual Service Companies and Subsidiary
Service Companies; Uniform System of Accounts for Public Utility Holding Companies.
The commission recognizes that, since the ordinary investor does not have the time or skill
necessary to translate the accounting language used by one issuer into the language used by
another issuer (Werntz, Standardization of Accounting Principles 1, 5, 9 (address released by
the Securities and Exchange Commission 1938)) that it is as imperative to standardize the accounting principles followed by ordinary businesses as to standardize those followed by public
utilities. But the commission also realized that extensive standardization must await the
formulation of principles upon which good accountants can agree (ibid.). For efforts to formulate accounting principles see generally American Institute of Accountants, Audits of Corporate Reports (1934); Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore, A Statement of Accounting Principles
(1938) and numerous articles in 9-.3 Accounting Rev. (i934-38) and 58-66 J. of Accountancy
(1934-38). A number of accounting principles upon which the commission has not yet taken

COMMENT
I. ORIGINAL VALUE OF FIXED ASSETS

It has been customary to enter fixed assets on the books at "cost."
The concept of "cost" is undoubtedly the most important valuation concept which the Securities and Exchange Commission's action has tended
to standardize; yet the only purported definition of "cost" that has been
found in the literature promulgated by the commission under the Securities Act involves a definition of the concept in terms of itself,42 and consequently is of no assistance in deriving the formula which the commission
has really standardized. There have been many opinions, however, dealing with statements of "cost" in registration statements and a number of
propositions have been established by the commission's decisions.
As of whatever time the cost of afixed asset may properly be determined, the
statement of cost may not exceed the exchange value43 in dollars of the assets
exchanged for the fixed asset as such exchange value was or would have been
fixed in a concurrent arms-length44 transaction. The leading authorities for
this proposition are the cases in which the commission has held that a
fixed asset may not be valued at the par value of stock exchanged therefor
45
when at the date of such exchange the stock was worth less than par.
As adequate evidence of arms-length value of stock at the date on which it
is exchanged for property, the commission accepts prices at which the
stock was sold to the public a short time before the exchange,46 the market
value of the stock at the date of the exchange,47 and the price at which the
registrant will re-purchase its stock. In Matter of Yumuri Jute Mills 48 the
a position will be incorporated in a regulation which will replace all financial statement instruction sets which the commission has promulgated pursuant to provisions of the Securities
and Securities Exchange Acts. Werntz, op. cit. supra, at 6.
42Instruction as to Items 12(c) and 13(d). Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form,
Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at 3 (1936).
43 By exchange value is meant market price.
44An arms-length transaction means a transaction between strangers in a market. The
transaction by definition is not a "forced sale"; it must be wholly voluntary on both sides.
Exhibit K, Instruction Book for Form A-O-I at 14 (1936).
45Matter of Unity Gold Corp., i S.E.C. 25, 33, i8 F.T.C. 649, 658 (i934); Matter of
Yumuri Jute Mills, 2 S.E.C. 8i, 85 (1937); Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines, 2 S.E.C.
226, 251 (i937); Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd. Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 7 (1937); Matter of
Virginia City Gold Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1615 at 3 (1937); Matter of Queensboro Gold
Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. x617 (i937).
46Matter of Unity Gold Corp. i S.E.C. 25, 33, i8 F.T.C. 649, 658 (1934); Matter of Nat'l
Boston Montana Mines Corp., 2 S.E.C. 226, 251 (1937); Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd.,
Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 7 (1937); Matter of Queensboro Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1617
(1937).
47 Matter of Virginia City Gold Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 6iS at 3 (1937).
48 2 S.E.C. 81, 84 (r937).
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registrant put a balance sheet value on fixed assets determined by the
stated value of no par common shares exchanged therefor. The registrant
had an option to repurchase most of such shares at one-fifth their stated
value but contended that this option would be exercised only if the
registrant were forced to offer common stock to underwriters at one-fifth
its stated value in order to induce them to underwrite an issue of registrant's preferred stock which was also being registered. The commission
held that, since the registrant had for purposes of re-purchase valued its
no par common stock at less than stated value the balance sheet item was
misleading. It is to be doubted that the result would have been the same
had the registrant offered proof that the market value of its stock was as
great as that stated.
Even when the market value of a share of registrant's stock is as great*
as its par or stated value, the principle suggested finds application when,
concurrently with the exchange of the fixed asset for a certain number of
shares in the registrant, the seller of the fixed asset donates shares back to
the issuer. 49 In such circumstances the proper accounting entries have uniformly been held to be a debit to the fixed asset of an amount equal to the
market value of the excess of shares exchanged over shares donated and an
off-setting credit to capital stock.
As of whatever time the cost of afixed asset may properly be determined, the
statement of cost should not exceed the exchange value in dollars of the fixed
asset as such exchange value was or would have been fixed in an approximately concurrent arms-length transaction.
In Matter of Continental Distillers & Importers Corp.s° the facts were
as follows: In October, 1933, S,apparently in an arms-length transaction,
paid $5,000.00 for certain land, building and equipment. On the same day

S resold this property to a promoter of the registrant for

$25,000.00

or

$35,000.00. Four days later the promoter, who controlled the registrant,

sold th property to the registrant, receiving payment in stock, the par
value of which was $75,000.00. In holding that it constituted a deficiency
to value the property on the registrant's balance sheet at $75,000.00, the

commission remarked that "in view of the two almost concurrent sales
of the property for $5,ooo.oo and $35,000.00 (or $25,00o.oo), it appears

that a large part of the considerationshould be considered payment to pro49Matter of Unity Gold Corp., i S.E.C. 25, 30, 18 F.T.C. 649, 655 (1934); Matter of
Bering Straits Tin Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1498 at 8 (1937); Matter of Virginia City Gold
Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. I615 at 3 (1937). Some accounting authorities sanctioned the
alternative procedure of setting up the fixed asset at the full par value of stock exchanged
therefor with the concurrent donation being set up as a treasury stock account. See citations
in Matter of Unity Gold Corp., i S.E.C. 25, 31, 18 F.T.C. 649, 656 (1934).

so 1 S.E.C. 54, 64, 78 (1935). Cf. discussion pp. 4O2- supra.
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moters and not cost of property.5 ' The very least that was necessary to
avoid a misleading effect in this respect was to state in connection with the
property item on the balance sheet, that cost was determined in a sale in
which the vendor ....was in control of the vendee ..... This fact is
stated neither on the face of the balance sheet nor in the accountant's
certificate."
The rule of the ContinentalDistillers case is not free from ambiguity.
Registrants, however, would be well-advised to interpret the rule as a
prohibition of any assertion that a fixed asset cost more than it would have
cost in an arms-length transaction, since there is authorityS indicating
that the result would have been the same had the distilling company included a qualifying statement in the balance sheet or in the accountant's
certificate.
If, at the time that the registrantpurchased afixed asset, the arms-length
exchange value of the assets exchanged by the corporationfor the fixed asset
was less than the arms-length exchange value of the fixed asset, the registrant
may not enter the asset at more than the arms-length value of the assets so
exchanged. While there is no direct holding to this effect, if, as has been
held,5 3 it is improper accounting practice for a registrant corporation
without an established record of earnings to write-up a fixed asset on the
basis of reproduction cost new when the asset had previously been valued
on the registrant's balance sheet at historical cost, it must be equally improper for such a registrant to make the same write-up when it had never
entered the asset on the balance sheet at historical cost.
Accounts urge,5 4 as reasons for write-up of fixed assets to reproduction
cost new, that failure to effect such write-up will result in underestimation
of the fund necessary to replace fixed assets and overstatement of earnings
from operations because depreciation would be figured upon too low a
basis.
The commission apparently feels that it is neither as important for a
concern to avoid such overstatement of its earnings nor to avoid understating the funds necessary for replacement of fixed assets, as it is that the
investor be not lulled into a feeling, induced by write-up of the fixed ass,It is improper accounting practice to include compensation to promoters for services as
cost of property. Matter of Unity Gold Corp., i S.E.C. 25, 30, 18 F.T.C. 649, 654 (1934) and
numerous succeeding cases.
S2Accounting Rel. 4 (1938).
s3Matter of Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1776 (1938); Accounting Rel. 8 (1938). Cf.
Atlantic, Birmingham and Coast Ry. v. United States, 296 U.S. 33, 39 (1935); Matter of
Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp., 2 S.E.C. 413 (1937). For citations to cases holding that
reproduction cost new is in any event only one factor to take into consideration in valuation of
fixed assets, see Matter of Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act Rel. X776 at 14, n. 27 (1938).
$4 Graham and Katz, Accounting in Law Practice § 127 (ist ed. r932).
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sets, that the concern has a favorable future.55 While the above principle is
derived from cases testing the adequacy of registration statements of untried concerns, there is no indication that the same principle would not be6
applied in ascertaining the value at cost of the assets of a "going concern.1s
The cost which the commission requires to be stated is the "cost to the enterprise of which the registrantis the whole or any part" and not the "cost to the
57
registrant."
2. CORRECTIONOF

ORIGINAL VALUE TO ACCORD WITH SUBSEQUENT VALUE

a) As discussed in the preceding section, the commission requires that
the registrant shows as the "cost" of a fixed asset either what was paid for
it or what it was worth, whichever amount was less at the time of purchase
of the asset. As time passes, and the useful life of the fixed asset grows
shorter, this original value ceases to bear any relation to actual value. On
the other hand, there still is no basis for determining with exactitude the
contribution of the fixed asset to the proceeds of future products and the
period of such contribution. In view of the certainty that subsequent
value is not equal to original value, and in view of the uncertainty as to
subsequent value, the commission has held on the one hand that failure
to depreciate or amortize an asset over its known or estimated life constitutes a deficiency, 5 at least, if the registrant does not make a statement
contradicting the assumption that it followed standard accounting principles.09 On the other hand, the commission appears to require no one
mode of setting up of a reserve for depletion or depreciation to effect
amortization of plant, buildings, and equipment, 6° intangible assets"
ssCommissioner Healy has said in this connection: "Accounting to me means the making
of a historical record of financial events. Valuation is a very different matter. I do not mean
that there are no circumstances under which unrealized losses or gains should be recognized on
books of account. I do believe that unrealized gains should not be entered into books of account until the probability or certainty of the permanence of the gain can be well established.
I believe that good accounting should observe this principle." Healy, op. cit. supra note ig, at 8.
56"Stop order opinions usually involve newly organized, and often wholly speculative companies. Yet the principles therein applied are equally applicable to established companies if
similar facts are involved." Werntz, op. cit. supranote 41 at 7.
-7 pp. 434-45 infra.
58Accounting Rel. 7 at 4 (1938). Cf. Matter of Golden Conqueror Mines Inc., Sec. Act
Rel. 152o at 7 (1937) (book value of a lease must be amortized over the life of the lease).
s"Matter of Underwriters Group Inc., Sec. Act Rel 1653 at 14 (1938). Cf. pp. 402-4 supra.
60Accounting Rel. 7 at 7 (1938) (failure to state the mode followed by the registrant con-

stitutes a material deficiency). Accord: Instruction 2, Instructions Pertaining to Balance
Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 29 (1937); Instruction ii, Financial Statement Instruction
Set No. i,Form E-i at 47; Schedule III, note (c), Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 42 (1937).
"1Accounting Rel. 7 at 7 (1938); Instruction 13, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i,
Form E-I at 47 (I937); Instruction 4, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer,
Form A-i at 29 (i937); Schedule V, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 44 (1937).
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investments, 62 debt discount and expense, 63 or of other deferred
6
charges. 4
b) The second mode of assigning subsequent value to fixed assets is by
appraisal. The concept of appraisal value which the Commission has standardized is well stated in the recent case of Matter of Breeze Corporation:5
If an appraisal or a representation of value purportedly based thereon, is not to be
misleading the appraisal must meet two tests. In the first place as we have observed in
in a previous opinion," an appraisal purports to be more than an arbitrary determination of value. It seeks to attach value to objects as a consequence of method ..... In
other words, it is misleading to represent as an appraisal a valuation which is not based
solely on scientific method but which rests in whole or even in part upon foundations
that are arbitrary or capricious. Inthe second place, there must be a fair and accurate
application of the methods purported to be followed. Thus valuations contained in an
appraisal purporting to follow certain norms, even though in the final analysis they represent merely informed judgments, nevertheless are representations that these norms
have been accurately and fairly followed. If the norms purported to be followed are not
fairly observed, the valuations finally arrived at are in essence misrepresentations of
fact because they untruthfully describe the basis upon which judgment has been exercised ..... The fact that valuations are in the final analysis expressions of judgment
does not warrant departure from these standards.
c) Even if a fixed asset has been properly depreciated, the possibility
remains that at the date of its abandonment it will appear that past estimates of the useful life of the asset were overly optimistic. The commission has a short answer to this problem. If a fixed asset has been abandoned6 8 or has become worthless, 9 the asset account 70 and any developmental expense assignable 7' thereto should immediately72 be written off
against earned surplus.
62Instruction 8, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 3o
('937); Instruction 9 as to Balance Sheets, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 32 (1937).
63 Instruction 14, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 31
(1937); Instruction 14, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. 1, Form E-i at 47 (1937).
64Instruction

15, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 47 ('937).

65Sec. Act Rel. 1786 at 7 (i938).
66Matter of Haddam Distillers Corp., i S.E.C. 37, 42 (I934).
67Ibid. For cases in which these tests have been applied see notes 77, 79-81,84 and 88 infra
68See Matter of Golden Conqueror Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. I52o at 5 (i937). Cf. Matter of
Metropolitan Personal Loan Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1594 at 4 ('937), with pp. 402-4 supra.
69Matter of American Gyro Co., i S.E.C. 83, 87 (i935). See Matter of Great Dike Gold
Mines Inc., i S.E.C. 621, 623 (1936).
70 Note 68 supra. The rule applies to current as well as to fixed assets. Instruction i,
Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Instruction Book for Form E-i at 44 (i937).
7' Matter of American Gyro Co., i S.E.C. 83, 87 (935). See also Matter of Great Dike
Gold Mining Co., i S.E.C. 621, 623-4 (1936); Matter of Golden Conqueror Mines Inc., Sec.
Act Rel. 152o at 5 (i937).
72 But cf. Instruction zo (e), Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 46

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

The above is what the commission has accomplished in standardizing
the modes of valuating fixed assets. It is apparent that the steps which
have been outlined are only suggestive of the wide possibilities of standardizing the conventions used in statements of financial condition. In the
interest of insuring ready comparability of balance sheets, it would also be
desirable to standardize balance sheet forms and to devise a uniform
system of balance sheet accounts. This note dismisses as beyond its scope
the commission's efforts7 3 to achieve these ends.
B. ABANDONMENT OF MONEY VALUATIONS

Far more novel, it would seem, is the second step that the commission
has taken to secure the proper disclosure of unavoidable uncertainty,
This step is the requirement that any stated value for fixed assets be
abandoned if such value is without significance.
The commission has decided that if, at the date of acquisition of a fixed
asset by the enterprise, the asset has not been valued in money in an armslength transaction, and if the assets for which the fixed asset is exchanged
by the enterprise have not been valued in money in an arms-length
transaction, the fixed asset may not be valued at a cost expressed in money
terms. This limitation found in Form A-O-I

4

is a reminder that even

cost, that most simple and seemingly always available test of value, may
be as illusory as any other measure of the value of fixed assets which is
expressed in money terms.
If the commission concludes that it is inappropriate to assign a money
value to a fixed asset,75 it requires the registrant to measure the cost of the
fixed asset in the terms of the assets for which it was acquired.76 For
example if the registrant has given ioooo shares of its common stock for
a mining property, and if neither the stock nor the property has been
valued in an arms-length transaction, the registrant is required to disclose that the property was acquired for io,ooo shares of stock.
Understanding of the circumstances under which it is the commission's
decision that appraised value be abandoned as materially misleading, requires familiarity with the cases in which the commission has held that,
7 Note 41 supra.
74Item r3(a)(c), Form A-O-i at 8 (1936); Schedule IV, Instruction Book for Form A-0-i
at 9,(1936)- Schedule K, Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at 14 (1936). Cf. Definition 16,
Form E-i at 3 (1937) with Item 44, Form E-i at 17 (1937) and with Note D, Form E-i at
30

(i937).

7s But cf. Matter of Platoro Gold Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1807 (1938). The possible
inference from this case is that the requirements of Form A-O-i do not prohibit balance sheet
valuations of fixed assets in the circumstances outlined in the text, but merely discourage them.
76 Schedule K, Instruction Book for Form A-O-z at 14 (i936).
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because appraised value is misleading, it may not be employed. Since they
merely illustrate the thesis that the investor is entitled to all presently
knowable data which is pertinent to him, those cases 77 will not be discussed in which untruth or omission has been predicated upon failure to
7 These cases are of two types:

(r) Cases in which the appraiser made no pretense of following scientific techniques.
Matter of Great Dike Gold Mines Inc., i S.E.C. 621, 626 (1936) (on the basis of a report made
by "glancing" athe property, the registrant asserted that the mine was an "extremely promising project"); Matter of Gilpin Eureka Consolidated Mines Inc., r S.E.C. 752, 757 (1936)
(valuation made by flashing a light on 75 feet of an 18o foot slope). Cf. Matter of Doris Ruby
Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1884 at 5 (1939).
(2) Cases in which the appraiser purported to follow scientific techniques, but did not
gather all the data which scientific method would require. This difficulty has arisen at practically all stages in the complicated process of appraising mining property. The commission
has found it to be deficient to assign any value to ore when the ore body has not been subjected
to any quantitative analysis (Matter of Gilpin Eureka Consolidated Mines Inc., i S.E.C. 752,
756, 758 (1936); Matter of Mining and Development Corp., i S.E.C. 786, 797 (1936); Matter
of Gold Dust Mining & Milling Co., Sec. Act Rel. z654 as amended by Sec. Act Rel. 1749 a
2, 3, n. 2 (1938); Matter of Platoro Gold Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1807 at 4 (1938)) or when
one dimension of the deposit is wholly unknown (Matter of Sunset Gold Fields Inc., 2 S.E.C.
329, 334 (I937)) or when the volume of the ore was arrived at by multiplying together arbitrary dimensions (Matter of Livingston Mining Co., 2 S.E.C. 141, 15o (i937); Matter of
South Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1694 at 3 (1938)) or when the registrant has obtained insufficient samples from the deposit (Matter of La Luz Mining Corp., i S.E.C. 217,
222-3 (i935); Matter of Sunset Gold Fields Inc., 2 S.E.C. 329, 334 (x937); Matter of Rickard
Ramore Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 377, 387 (1937); Matter of Platoro Gold Mines Inc., Sec.
Act Rel. 1807 at 4 (1938)) or has averaged samples without weighting them for variations in
size of the bodies of ore which they represent (Matter of Franco Mining Co., i S.E.C. 285,
291 (1936)). Under any of these circumstances, the registrant may make no allegation of ore
volume, of ore tonnage, or of assay results; nor may he assign money value to the ore. When
quantitative data with respect to an ore body is known with a degree of exactitude sufficient
to enable the registrant to describe the ore quantitatively, the registrant nevertheless may not
make representations based on such data which convey the impression of being more precise
than the data on which they are based. Matter of Gilpin Eureka Consolidated Mines Inc.,
I S.E.C. 752, 756, 758, (1936); Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines, 2 S.E.C. 226, 257
(1937). Even if the registrant is able to state the tonnage and assay of the ore accurately, his
representation of its value may be deficient for failure to consider all costs (including costs of
selling or marketing) in determining the net recovery value of the ore (Matter of South
Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. x694 at 3-4 (1938)), for failure to ascertain costs of ore
reduction at the level of production at which the registrant's ore reduction plant will probably
operate (Matter of Sunset Gold Fields, 2 S.E.C. 329, 335 (i937) ) or for failure to discount the
ore value to present worth (Matter of La Luz Mining Corp., i S.E.C. 217, 223 (1935); Matter
of American Terminals and Transit Corp., i S.E.C. 701, 79 (1936); Matter of Mining and
Development Corp., i S.E.C. 786, 795 (1936); Matter of Emporia Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C
209, 218 (1937); Matter of Sunset Gold Fields Inc., 2 S.E.C. 329, 331).
An appraised valuation resting upon guess rather than upon scientific method will be held
to constitute an untrue statement if it exceeds the cost of the asset as previously defined, at
least if the guess-work is not revealed. Matter of Gold Dust Mining & Milling Co., Sec. Act
Rel. 1654 as amended by Sec. Act Rel. 1749 at 4 (1938). Nor if a valuation restsupon surmise
will it be cured by being reduced in a proportion, also determined by guesswork (ibid).
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rest appraised value upon data which the registrant should have obtained
if he sought to follow an appraisal technique for which there was substantial authority, and which he could reasonably7 have obtained at the
effective date of the registration statement.
In a number of different situations, however, the commission has held
that appraised value is materially deficient, not because of any willful or
negligent conduct on the part of the registrant in failing to gather data,
but because, at the effective date of the registration statement, the registrant was unable to furnish sufficient facts upon which to rest appraised
value. One instance of such inability occurs when it is impossible to reach
the fixed asset in order to secure data. 9 More important is that class of
cases in which the registrant is unable to present an acceptable valuation
of a fixed asset, because any appraisal must take into account as a factor
the future demand for the registrant's product. If there are no circumstances justifying any assertions as to the future demand for the registrant's product, the commission holds that no appraised value may be
assigned to the fixed asset. Thus the registrant may not set up intangible
values upon the basis of expectation of future profit when the concern has
no record of past profit, and when the future demand for its product is
highly speculative.8 0 Nor may land and factory be appraised at reproduction cost new for a going distillery concern when the land and factory
constituted an abandoned manufacturing site, and when no sale of comparable land and factory has been made in the vicinity in the recent
past. 81 It is now the general rule that the registrant may not value at
reproduction cost new the fixed assets of an enterprise without a past
record of profits when such valuation leads to a write-up of the assets
above their cost to the enterprise.12
The general principle of this last group of cases has been embodied in
Form A-O-i, which is used for the registration of mining corporations in a
promotional stage. Assuming the registrant gives affirmative and satis78Note 38 supra.
79Matter of Franco Mining Co., i S.E.C. 285, 290 (r936) and Matter of Emporia Gold
Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 220 (1937) (mines inundated); id. at 219 (ground frozen).

80Matter of American Gyro Co., i S.E.C. 83, 88 (i935) (registrant set up "good-will");
Matter of Peterson Engine Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1629 at ii (937)
a patent).

(registrant assigned value to

$1Matter of Continental Distillers and Importers Corp., i S.E.C. 54, 69, 75, 79, 8i (1935)
(in this case the "rdproduction cost new" or "sound value" was included not in the balance
sheet, but in the accountant's certificate and in the report of the appraiser).
82 Note 53 supra. In such circumstances it would seem that the registrant must at least
reveal the cost of the assets to the enterprise. See pp. 443-44 infra.
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factory answers to all items s3 required by that form, he will have furnished
the knowable data with respect to ore deposits which heretofore has been
regarded as sufficient to support a money valuation of ore reserves. Any
additional factors necessary in order to place a money value upon ore
reserves are the estimated price at which the metal will be sold, the estimated life of the mine, and the corrective factor used to nullify any margin
of error in computing the two factors last named.8 4 Because these three
factors are estimates of whose validity there can be no objective test if the
ore deposit is owned by a newly organized registrant which does not succeed to an established business, the commission enjoins a newly organized
mining corporation from ascribing appraised values to its mines' s and at
the same time requires disclosure of the basic data upon which appraised
value was formerly thought to rest.86
C. BISTORICAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION

The instances outlined above in which the commission has required the
registrant to abandon money valuation of fixed assets are all instances in
which the registrant was an unseasoned enterprise. Some element of estimate goes into any valuation of a fixed asset, 7 and accordingly an appraisal of the fixed assets of a "going concern" may be exposed to the
objection that it involves the use of a method of valuation which employs
83The registrant is required to describe and state the present condition of each mining
property operated by the registrant (Item 3o(a), Form A-O-i at i8 (1936) ), whether any ore
bodies have been sufficiently developed to justify designation as proven or probable (Item 34,
Form A-O-i at 20 (1936) ), the weight or volume of proven and probable ore (Item 3 4 A, Form
A-O-i at 2oA (1936) (but not of ore neither proven nor probable (id.)), and the facts indicating the existence, in accord with registrant's claims, of any ore which is neither proven
nor probable (Item 37, Form A-O-i at 22 (1936)). "Proven" ore means a block of ore so extensively surrounded by sampled faces that the risk of failure in continuity is reduced to a
minimum, and "probable" ore means ore as to which the risk of failure in continuity is greater
than for proven ore, but as to which there is sufficient evidence for assuming continuity of
the ore. Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at 2. For illustrations of cases in which the commission has held that no quantitative data may be presented with respect to ore deposits
and that consequently the ore may not be denominated as "proven" or "probable," see note
77 supra.
Other data which a registrant on Form A-O-i is called upon to present include the methods
employed in sampling ore and the number of samples taken (Item 33,Form A-0-i at 20 (1936)),
the total estimated cost of recovery per unit of weight or volume of crude proven or probable
ore (Item 34B, Form A-0-i at 20B (1936)), the proposed plan of exploration, development,
and operation of the mines (Item 3r, Form A-O-i at 19 (1936) ), the three principal markets for
each constituent of the ore not to be sold for its metallic content (Item 35, Form A-O-i at 21
(1936)), and the specific basis of any special value claimed for any mining property operated
by the registrant (Item 38, Form A-O-i at 23 (1936)).
84Cf. Matter of Monitor Gold Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1874 at i (i939).
's

Pp. 414-I5 supra.

86 P.

4x6 supra.

87pP.407-8 supra.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

doubtful factors in such a manner as to resolve a preponderance of doubt
in favor of the owner of the assets.8 8 In spite of this fact, the forms which
are not forms used solely for the registration of unseasoned enterprises rely
upon techniques other than the abandonment of fixed asset valuation to
bring out the uncertainties inherent in fixed asset valuation.
The first of these techniques, disclosure of historical financial information, is predicated upon the theory that information with respect to the
entries summarized in the balance sheet accounts will enable the investor
to face risks more intelligently by enabling him to project into the future
trends observable in the course of the registrant's past history. 9
The importance and prevalence of historical information are suggested
by the view of Commissioner Healy that the balance sheet is more accurately regarded as a recapitulation of the financial history of the enterprise than as either a statement of the value of the enterprise at the balance sheet date or as a prediction of the money figures at which claims by
or against the enterprise will be realized. 9° As an historical record, however, the balance sheet is inadequate since it portrays the result of past
accounting entries but does not disclose their details. It may be assumed that the corporation which followed customary standards of financial reporting as they were formulated prior to the Securities Act took
cognizance of this inadequacy, and presented the prospective investor
with a profit and loss statement and perhaps a statement of surplus for
the accounting period preceding investment. In its requirements as to the
provision of historical financial information, the commission has sought in
the first place to standardize and improve the quality and quantity of
information customarily provided through the medium of the profit and
loss statement and the statement of surplus.
8 Matter of Plymouth Consolidated Gold Mines, i S.E.C. 139, 145 (1935) (assignment of
value to an ore body on the basis of sampling its richest areas); Matter of Oklahoma-Texas
Trust, Sec. Act Rel. x563 at i5 (1937), aff'd. ioo F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. ioth 1939) (resolution of
all doubtful factors involved in use of the volumetric method of determination of oil reserves in
favor of the registrant); Matter of Breeze Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1786 at io (1938) (valuation of
intangibles on the basis of a sales volume over double that the registrant had had in the past;
this sales volume was obtained by making an admittedly arbitrary calculation of a percentage
of an estimated national demand which the registrant would serve); Matter of Monitor Gold
Mining Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1874 at 2 (1939) (a valuation obtained by reduction of estimated
future return to present worth was held materially deficient because it employed a rate of
capitalization which greatly underestimated the risk attendant upon valuation of mining
property in this manner). Cf. Matter of Big Wedge Mining Co., x S.E.C. 98, io3 (1935).
89 See Sanders, Accounting Aspects of the Securities Act, 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 191,
206 (I937).

90Healy, op. cit. supranote i9, at 8; see also Sanders, op. cit. supranote 89, at 195.
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In its treatment of the profit and loss statement the commission's
reforms have proceeded along three general lines: standardization of the
function of the profit and loss statement, segregation in the profit and loss
statement of items significantly different, and extension of the time period
for which information as to operations is required.
The commission has established that the function of the profit and loss
statement is to portray changes in earned surplus 9z resulting from earnings or losses in the accounting period for which the statement is furnished.92 Commonplace as this proposition may appear, the commission
has had occasion to apply it in several cases. It has been held, for example, that contributions should not be included in the profit and loss
statement as earned income and may only be validly set up as donated
surplus;93 that if the registrant sets up the expense of developing an asset
during an accounting period in the asset account "development expense,"
it is improper accounting practice to reflect income from the asset attributable to the same accounting period in the profit and loss statement; 94 and that, if the period of development of a fixed asset has ceased,
it is improper to debit expenses incurred in operations in the asset
account, developmental expense, and to fail to charge them to profit
and loss.95 The above decisions point toward the adoption by the commission of the so-called "accrual" basis of allocating income and expense.
Nothing to the contrary follows from the decision that a paper profit
obtained by accepting in settlement of a debt an evidence of indebtedness
with greater face value than the amount of the debt may not be treated as
income until realized 96 since accountants who follow an "accrual" basis
9'

Financial Statement Form No.

2,

Form E-i at 37, 39 (I937); Item 55, Form A-i at 24,

27 (1937).

92Accounting Rel. 7 at 6 (1938).
93Matter of General Income Shares Inc., i S.E.C. 1o, 113 (1935); Matter of Nat'l Educators Mutual Ass'n, i S.E.C. 208, 214 ('935); Autostrop Safety Razor Co. v. Comm'r, 28 B.T.A.
621, aff'd 74 F. 2(d) 226 (C.C.A. 2d 1934); United States v. Oregon-Washington Ry. and Nav.

Co., 251 Fed. 211 (C.C.A. 2d 1918); Finney, Principles of Accounting c. 38 at 6 (1931);
Kester, Advanced Accounting 361 (1933); Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice 414
('934).
94The Commission remarked in the American Terminals and Transit case that "accountants generally advocate that all income from a property in development be applied in reduction
of development expense capitalizing only the excess of expense over income." I S.E.C. 701,
710 (1936).
9s Matter of Virginia City Gold Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1615 at 2 (1937).
96Matter of Metropolitan Personal Loan Co., Sec. Act Rel. I594 at 4, 7 (1937). See Matter
of General Income Shares Inc., i S.E.C. 110, 112 (1935); 1 Finney, Principles of Accounting
c. 2 at 2 (1931); Paton, Accountants' Handbook 1076 (1934); Kester, Advanced Accounting
492 (1933).
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in timing income agree that conservative practice requires no income to
97
be taken until it is both accrued and realized.
It is beyond the scope of this note to make a detailed examination of the
promulgated forms of profit and loss statements in order to show the extent of segregation of classes of income and expense and particularity of
description which they require. The elaborate and detailed disclosure required by the forms has been commented on elsewhere, 98 and is well illustrated by the commission's decision that it constitutes a deficiency to
characterize unusual and non-recurrent income as "other income" without
making explanation of its non-recurrent character. 99
The commission's third reform of the profit and loss mode of presenting
financial information has been to require profit and loss statements for at
least the three years in the life of the enterprise immediately preceding
registration."° °
While differing as to the exact disclosure required by means of historical
statements of surplus supplementary to the profit and loss statements, the
forms agree in requiring much that was not formerly customary. For example, Form A-2 demands for the accounting period preceding registration a schedule of surplus showing additions and charges to capital surplus
segregated from additions and charges to earned surplus,"°' and in support
of every required profit and loss statement Form A-2 requires a schedule
of income from dividends. ° 2 Other forms enjoin the registrant to submit
statements of earned"' 3 and/or paid-in ° 4 and/or capital"' s surplus for each
period for which profit and loss statements must be furnished.
The most important innovations introduced by the commission with
respect to historical financial analysis consist in extending the historical
mode of analysis to accounts other than the surplus account, and in extending the time period of historical analysis.
To illustrate the value of the former: Suppose the registrant develops a
mine, begins active operations, and suffers losses which it conceals by
writing-up the value of the mine. No profit and loss statement, statement
97 Note 184 infra.

98Sanders, op cit. supranote 89, at 207.
99Matter of American Terminals and Transit Co., i S.E.C. 701, 708 (1936).

at

1o0Instruction r, Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form A-2
(1937); Item 55, Form A-i at 24 (1937); Exhibit Q, Form E-i at 22 (1937).
lox Schedule VII, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 46 (1937).
102 Schedule IX, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 48 (1937).
;03 Financial Statement Form No. 2, Form E-i at 39 ( 93 7); Item 55, Form A-i at 27 (1937).
22

304 Instruction 22, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 49 (1937).
X05Instruction 23, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 49 (1937).
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of surplus, or balance sheet would disclose the erroneous practice. But a
schedule of property, plant, and equipment would reveal the overstatement. Accordingly, the principal forms for registration used by concerns
which are not newly organized at the date of registration require the
registrant to disclose the nature and details of transactions giving rise to
any substantial unrealized appreciation or write-down of property, plant,
and equipment ° 6 since January 1, 1922,107 with a statement of the contra
accounting entries and related acjustments in reserves."°8 Like information since January i, 1922, is required for intangible assets 0 9 and investment x accounts. Form A-2 further requires the registrant to include a
schedule for the accounting period preceding registration of the credits offsetting debits to the following accounts: maintenance and repairs; depreciation, depletion and amortization; taxes; management and service
contract fees; and rents and royalties."
All basic forms used by concerns which are not in a promotional stage
require that the registrant reveal the methods used in setting up reserves
for depreciation, depletion, or amortization' 2 the debits and credits to
106Instruction io, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. x, Form E-1 at 46 (1937).
107 Instruction x,
Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-z at 29
(31937).
lo8 Item 45, Form A-2 at i (1937). Form A-2 also requires the filing of a schedule which
shows the accounting entries to property, plant and equipment during the last accounting
period. Schedule IE,Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 41 (1937).
loInstruction i2(a), Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form ,-i
at 47 (1937);
Instruction 3 B, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 29 (1937);
Item 45, Form A-2 at 11 (i937). Form A-2 also requires a schedule of debits and credits to
intangibles and offsetting entries during the last accounting period. Schedule IV, Instruction
Book for Form A-2 at 43 (1937).
110Item 45, Form A-2 at 1i (1937); Schedule I, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 39 (i937)
(investments in securities of affiliates during accounting periods for which profit and loss statements are required to be furnished); Instruction 5,Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets
of the Issuer, Form A-i at 30 (1937) (accounts in which any differences between cost and ledger value of securities of affiliates are reflected as of the date of registration); Instruction
6(b)(c), Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form E-x at 45 (1937) (difference between cost and ledger value of securities of affiliates and accounts in which the
difference is reflected).
i Schedule VIII, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 47 (1937).
12 Instruction 2A, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at
29 (i937); Instruction 4,Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i
at 29 (937); Instruction 8, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i
at 3o (1937); Instructions 14, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i
at 31 (i937); Instruction 15, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i

at 31 (i937); Instruction 9,Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 46 (1937);

Instruction ii(a), Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i,Form E-i at 47 (i937); Schedule
III, note (c), Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 42 (1937); Schedule V, note (i)(b), Instruction
Book for Form A-2 at 44 (I937).
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those reserves for various periods,1 3 the contra accounts involved in their
creation," 4 and in two forms a detailed statement of previous allocation of
depreciation for income tax purposes as compared with its allocation for
dividend purposes." S
Another striking way in which the commission has promoted historical
analysis of business conditions is by extending the period of analysis. It
was indicated above that the commission projects historical analysis into
the past by requiring profit and loss statements and statements of surplus
for at least three years" 6 and historical analysis of certain accounts for as
many as fifteen years." There remains for consideration the commission's
effort to require the registrant to project its business condition into the
immediate future in such manner as to empower the investor to visualize
the condition of the registrant immediately following the distribution of
the registered securities, and, in addition, to enable him to ascertain the
risk he assumes that the balance of the securities will never be distributed.
The forms for registration accordingly require disclosure of such matters as: the proceeds' 8 to the registrant expected to be realized from the
sale of securities ;19 the proposed disposition of the monies received"20 from
"3 Form A-2 requires this information for only the accounting periods for which balance
sheets must be furnished, Schedules III and V, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 42,44 (i937);
but cf. Item 45, Form A-2 at ii (1937) (changes in property accounts since January 1, 1922).
Form A-i requires the registrant to state the methods used in creating reserves for amortization of intangibles since January I, 1922. Instruction 4, Instructions Pertaining to Balance
Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 29 (1937).
114Instruction 8, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of .the Issuer, Form A-I at

30(1937)0
2S Instruction 2, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 29
(1937); Instruction ri, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 47 (1937).
116 Note ioo supra.
11 Notes 107-9 supra.
Is By "proceeds" is meant sale price less expenses of distribution.
119Item 26, Form A-i at 8 (1937); Item 4o(a), Form A-O-i at 24 (936); Item i8(a), Form
A-O-i at io (1936); Item 17, Form A-O-i at io (1936) (detailed explanation if the proceeds
from the sale of the registered securities are not to be received by the registrant); Item 27(c),
Form A-2 at 8 (i937); Item 3o, Form E-i at 14 (1937); cf. Item 8, Form E-i at 6 (1937). A
statement of estimated proceeds is false if it exceeds the face value of the securities available
for sale to the public. Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines Corp., 2 S.E.C. 226, 245 (I937).
120 The forms require that the registrant make: (i) a statement of underwriting discounts
or commission paid or to be paid (notes i59, 171, and 174 ilfra); (2) a summary and itemization of other expenses in connection with sale of the securities (Item 27(b), Form A-2 at 8
(i937), Item i8(c), Form A-O-i at io (1936); Item 37, Form A-i at 12 (i937); Item 29, Form
E-i at 14 (I937)); (3) a reasonably itemized statement of the purposes for which the net proceeds (gross proceeds less all expenses of distributing the registered issue) are to be used (Item
28, Form A-2 at 8 (i937); Item 27, Form A-i at 8 (937); Item 32, Form E-i at i5 (937);
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sales of the registered securities

21

and any changes in such disposition

which would result from the ripening into actuality of contingencies
which can be anticipated; 12" the estimated funds to be received by the

registrant from sources other than the sale of the registered securities"2
and the funds which the registrant must so receive if it is to carry out
successfully the business program envisaged at the effective date of the
registration statement. 24 One form requires the registrant to furnish a

pro forma balance sheet which gives effect to the proposed securities distribution,"1 but seemingly no proformabalance sheet may be furnished by

the registrant as part of a prospectus unless an underwriter is under a
Item 43, Form A-O-i at 25 (1936)); and (4)a description of property to be purchased with the
proceeds of the registered issue (Item 40, Form A-i at 3 (1937); Item 29, Form A-2 at 8 (1937);
Item 32, Form E-i at i5 (x937)).
,"'
Failure to state and itemize this data constitutes a material deficiency. Matter of West
Park Apts. Corp., Sec. Act Rel. i8ii at 9 (1938) (construction of Item 37, Form A-i at 12
('937)).
Answers to these items have been condemned: (i) for vagueness (Matter of Lewis American
o
Airways, i S.E.C. 33 , 343 (1936) (statement that the money will be used for "development
and completion to marketable state" of an aircraft invention or in the alternative for "general
corporate uses"); Matter of Consolidated Mines Syndicate, 2 S.E.C. 316, 323 (937) (statement that money will be used for "operation and administration expense" when no further
statement was made as to allocation of funds among the registrant's several properties) ); (2) for
failure to state all the known facts with rspect to disposition of the proceeds (Matter of
Consolidated Funds Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1548 at 3 (1937) (statement that the funds would be
used to purchase securities or other property to be held by the issuer as investments without
further disclosure of companies in which the registrant intends to invest at the effective date
of the registration statement); Matter of Crusader Aircraft Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1677 at 4
(1938) (if the registrant is without funds at the effective date of the registration statement, it
must list current liabilities in answer to these items). Cf. Matter of Paper Sales Co. of Detroit,
Sec. Act Rel. i556 (1937) ); (3) for failure to disclose clearly any areas of doubt as to the disposition of the funds: this objection may be raised when the registrant confidently states that
it will use funds for certain purposes and the statement is a mere guess (Matter of Emporia
Gold Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 216 (1937); Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines, 2 S.E.C.
226, 246 (1937); Matter of Crusader Aircraft Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1677 at 4 (938) ), or when
the registrant furnishes a detailed statement of uses to which funds will be put when reasonably prompt expenditures of the nature indicated are not warranted (Matter of Emporia Gold
Mines Inc., 2 S.E.C. 209, 216 (1937); Matter of Consolidated Mines Syndicate, 2 S.E.C. 316,

323 (1937) ).

An estimate that funds will be used for a given purpose may be shown to have been made
in bad faith and hence to be false and deficient by evidence, that funds were never thereafter
used for the given purpose. Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines Corp., 2 S.E.C. 226, 246

(1937)-

,'Cf. Item 43, Form A-O-z at 25 (1936). But even if a form does not call for this information explicitly, it must be given. Matter of Mining and Development Corp., i S.E.C. 786,
8o8 (1936); Matter of Bering Straits Tin Mines Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1498 at 7 (1937); Matter
of Queensboro Gold Mines Ltd. Sec. Act Rel. 1617 at 2 (1937).
"sItem 40(b), Form A-O-i at 24 (1936); Item 30(b), Form E-z at 14 (1937).
12S
Exhibit S, Form E-i at 22 (1937).
" Item 41, Form A-O-i at 24 (1936).
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firm commitment to effect the distribution of which the proforma balance
6
sheet expresses the result.12

D. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The commission's elaborate regulations to assure disclosure of the

separate entries summarized in the balance sheet fixed asset accounts
enable the investor to be cognizant of the risks concealed by the assignment of balance sheet values to fixed assets. The requirement that securities issuers reveal historical financial information is, however, far from
the only device used by the commission to bring to the attention of investors unavoidable uncertainties glossed over by the illusory exactitude
of balance sheet values. The commission, for example, minimizes the misleading effect of balance sheet valuations by requiring the registrant to disclose any divergence between cost and market 2 7 value of marketable securities ; 8between ledger and market value129 and cost 30 of securities held
for investment; and between cost, ledger value, and unrealized apprecia3
tion in value of property, plant and equipment,1 1 and intangibles.32
"2 Matter of Haddam Distillers Corp., i S.E.C. 48, 53 (1934); Matter of Continental Distillers and Importers Corp., i S.E.C. 54, 78 (I935).
127 Market value may be determined as of the balance sheet date (Instruction 3, Financial
Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 44 (1937); Instruction 6, Financial Statement
Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 45 (1937)), or it may be determined as of the nearest
available date to that of the balance sheet. Cf. Instruction 6, Financial Statement Instruction
Set No. x, Form E-i at 46 (i937). To assign a market value to a security implies that the
security has a definitely determinable market value. Instruction 6(a) (9), Financial Statement
Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 45 (1937).
128 Instruction 3, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. r, Form E-i at 44 (937).
But
under Form A-2 the requirement is that if marketable securities are not valued at market,
that current market quotations must be shown in the balance sheet parenthetically. Instruction 2, Instructions as to Current Assets, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 31 (937). Form
A-i only requires the basis of the valuation to be given. Instruction i i, Instructions Pertaining
to Balance Sheets of Issuer, Form A-i at 3° (1937).
129Schedule iA, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 4o (1937).
1s Instruction 6A, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at
30 (1937); Instruction 7(b), Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-I at 46 (1937);
Item 45(a), Form A-2 at ix (937) (this item only requires valuation at cost or appraised value
if the security had been valued at cost since January 1, 1922).
131 Instruction iA(a)(b)(d), Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form
A-i at 29 (i937); Instruction 24, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer,
Form A-i at 32 (9.37); Instruction io, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. z, Instruction
Book for Form E-i at 46 (i937); Schedule II, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 41 (I937)
(only applies to accounts altered during the accounting periods for which balance sheets must
be furnished); Item 45(a), Form A-2 at,, (1937)
(only calls for cost incurred and revaluation
made since January i, 922).
132 Instruction z2, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 47 (I937);
Schedule IV, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 43 (937) (only applies to accounts altered
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While the required data with respect to cost might be regarded as purely
historical, and not intended to shed any light upon the uncertainty inherent in assignment of present value, such is not true when the cost is one
incurred shortly before registration.
The commission also exacts disclosure of the cost to insiders of property
acquired or to be acquired by the registrant from insiders other than in the
ordinary course of business and within two years of filing of the registration statement. 3 3 The investor consequently is afforded a graphic Mustration of the business risks which make possible radical divergence between cost of fixed assets to insiders and the value of those assets to the
business enterprise.
A third technique used by the commission to impeach the definitive
character of fixed asset valuations may be termed the descriptive technique. Qualitative description has always been an important element of
security selling literature. Unfortunately the description has as often as
not been of facts wholly immaterial to the investor. 34 The commission
has sought to make the descriptive technique a real instrument of disclosure of unavoidable risk.
The use of this technique is well illustrated by the cases which have
construed the items in the forms which exact disclosure of the character of
the business done and to be done by the registrant.'3 5 In Matter of Virduring the accounting periods for which balance sheets must be furnished); Item 45(a), Form
A-2 at zi (1937) (only calls for cost incurred or revaluation since January 1, 1922). Cf. Instruction 3 B, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-I at 29 (1937)
(comparative statement of cost and ledger value of each class of intangibles since January z,
1922, with a complete statement of the differences if any).
'13 Form A-I does not expressly require cost of property to insiders to be stated. But Item
45 of that form has been construed to require disclosure of the cost to certain insiders of any
property acquired or proposed to be acquired from such insiders other than in the ordinary
course of the registrant's business and within two years of the filing of the registration statement. (Item 45, Form A-i at x5 (i937); Matter of Plymouth Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd.,
i S.E.C. 139, i44 (1935); Matter of La Luz Mining Corp., i S.E.C. 217, 223 (1 9 3 5); Matter of
Mining and Development Corp., i S.E.C. 786, 792 (1936). Other forms specifically require
disclosure of cost to insiders (Item 12(b)(c), Form A-O-i at 7 (1936); Item 27, Form E-i at 14

(i937); Item 35, Form A-2 at 9 (I937) ) although differing somewhat as to the proper definition
of "insiders."
134 See Sears, The New Place of the Stockholder 140 (1929).
'3s Item 3, Form A-i at i (i937); Items 3, 4, Form A-O-i at 2 (1936); Item S, Form E-i at
6 (1937); Item 5, Form A-2 at 1 (i937). The general rule for answering these items is that
they do not relate to the powers and objects specified in the charter of the registrant business
but to the actual business done and to be done, and that consequently to answer the items by
stating the kind of business done or to be done will not be adequate. Instructions as to Items
3 and 4, Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form, Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at

3 (i96).
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ginia City Gold Mining Co.,. 6 for example, by stating that it was engaged
in development work the registrant avoided the common trap of asserting
that it was engaged in "mining" when it was not then engaged in extracting ore for sale in the market.3 7 Nor does it appear that the registrant's
statement that it would engage in mining in the future was deficient for
failure to state the probable minimum period intervening before profitable
production. 38 The commission nevertheless found that the registrant's
assertion that it was engaged in developmental work held forth an allure of
future profit and was therefore deficient in the absence of disclosure of the
registrant's past history of operating losses.
E. NA1E AND PRICE

The preceding discussion has been of the techniques employed by the
commission to effectuate disclosure of facts necessary for informed analyx36Sec.

Act Rel. i6r5 at 2 (1937).
The general rule, that it is improper to state that a certain business is being done unless
it is being done at the date of registration, has been applied in two situations. (i) When the
registrant's answer conveys the impression that the registrant is carrying on a business in
which it has never been employed. In Matter of Lewis American Airways, x S.E.C. 330, 343
(1936) the registrant stated that its business was the "manufacture, sale and repair of motor
vehicles and airships." In holding this answer deficient the commission remarked, "the evidence at the hearing quite clearly disclosed that not even one model of the airmobile has been
completed and that only one of the proposed airplanes is at present in existence .... The registrant should have disclosed that it had only completed one airplane which had not been
tested by the Department of Commerce nor even successfully flown." Cf. Matter of Crusader
Aircraft Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1677 (1938). A statement that the registrant is engaged in gold
mining is deficient when the only gold produced had been in connection with developmental
work. Matter of Sunset Gold Fields Inc., 2 S.E.C. 329, 335 (1937). Cf. Matter of Great Dike
Gold Mines Inc., r S.E.C. 621, 626 (1936). A statement that a certain business is carried on is
deficient when at the effective date of the registration statement, the registrant does not own
the equipment to enable it to carry on that business. Matter of Consolidated Mines Syndicate,
2 S.E.C. 316, 323 (i937). (2) When the registrant's answer conveys the impression that it is
carrying on a business in which it has ceased to engage. Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd.,
-Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 13 (statement that the registrant is engaged in mining when its sole
source of product has been depleted); Matter of Commonwealth Bond Corp., i S.E.C. 13,
i9, i8 F.T.C. 635, 643 (1934) (statement that the registrant is selling bonds when for a number
of years its sole activity has been the reorganization of its defaulted issues).
1s8 Matter of Major Metals Corp., 2 S.E.C. 74, 76 (1937) (registrant's assertion that it
proposed to examine certain mining properties and on the basis of such examination to acquire,
rehabilitate and bring them into profitable production held deficient for failure to state that
such examination would take time and that experience in the mining industry indicated that
profitable production would be still further deferred, and that operation at a profit, which
might profitably be applied to interest charges, might well begin only after three or four years).
A registrant's prophecy of future profits will be held deficient if the great preponderance of
evidence is against such opinion being valid (Matter of American Kid Co., i S.E.C. 694, 697-9
(1936)) or if the future profits of the registrant are entirely conjectural (Matter of American
Terminals and Transit Co., i S.E.C. 701, 739-40 (1936)).
137
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sis of unavoidable risk and its commensurate or non-commensurate relation to rate of return. The commission, however, has also undertaken to
aid the investor who relies, not upon informed analysis of the enterprise in
which he invests, but, instead, upon the good or bad name of the enterprise or upon the trend of the prices at which its securities are sold.
To protect those who may rely upon the name of the enterprise, the
commission will hold a registration statement deficient if the registrant
has a name which the investor is likely to confuse with that of another
existing company, 139 at least if the registrant does not dearly distinguish
itself from the similarly named enterprise.114 In this type of litigation the

commission considers trade name cases to be valuable precedents. X'4
More important is the disclosure required by the Commission with
respect to the significance of the price at which the registered issue is to be
offered to the public. The process of securities distribution frequently involves the sale of the security in large blocs, its resale in smaller blocs, and
its further resale in still smaller blocs until eventually small holdings
percolate down to "Main Street" investors.142 The distribution price for a

security is hence apt to be fixed, not by the action of small investors, but
by the action of large purchasers of the issue. Large investors, if perfectly
informed of risks inherent in investment in the registrant and if they purchase in a perfect market, will fix a price which reflects the security's value
as estimated by the most informed persons. The small investor will obtain the benefit of this price no matter how uninformed he may be. If,
however, the market for a security is for some reason 43 not a perfect
market, this happy condition may not be realized.
The commission consequently has been alert to require that the registrant reveal any divergence between the price at which the security is
offered, and the price of the security as it would be determined in a
perfect market. 144 Accordingly if the registrant states a flat price at which
'39 Matter of Nat'l Educators' Mutual Ass'n, i S.E.C. 2o8, 212 (1935) (National Educators'
Mutual Ass'n Inc.-National Education Ass'n); Matter of Gold Hunter Extension Inc., Sec.
Act Rel. 1813 at 2 (1938) (Gold Hunter Extension Inc.-Gold Hunter Mine). Cf. Matter of
Securities Exchange Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 1395 (1937) (Securities Exchange Corp.-Securities and Exchange Comm'n).
'40 Matter of Gold Hunter Extension Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 1813 at 3 (1938).
'41Id. at 2, 3r42 pP. 430-34 infra.
143Lack of mobility of buyers or sellers and lack of perfect competition are the most notable
causes of the imperfect character of markets.
144 The following items require the disclosure of the price at which each registered security
is proposed to be offered to the public, and, if the price is not a fixed price, the method by which
the offering price will be computed. Item 34, Form A-i at i1 (1937); Items i8, xg, Form A-O-i
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the security will be offered to the public, he need not disclose that the
recent price of the security was lower than the offering price, 45 since the
public is given fair warning that it is purchasing at a price determined by
46
the issuer, and not at one determined by impartial market forces.
If the registrant, however, indicates that the security will be offered at
the market price, the commission takes the position that "the investor is
entitled to knowledge of any artificial restraint upon the flow of the security into the market and of any past or possible artificial future demand
for the security so that he may determine for himself to what extent the
market price represents the collective judgment of buyers and sellers as
to the merits of the security rather than a price induced by abnormal demands for and abnormal restraints upon the security."'' 47 In carrying out
at io, I1 (1936); Item 24, Form A-2 at 8 ('937); Item 33, Form E-i at 15 (1937). Item 22 of
Form A-O-i requires the registrant to state whether any person or persons to the knowledge of
the registrant are to maintain a market for any of the securities being registered. For a discussion of Item 36, the analogous provision of Form C-i for investment trusts, see Matter of
T.I.S. Management Corp., Sec. Act Rel. i689 (1938). On the basis of the disclosure required
by the above items, it is apparent that the commission is interested in obtaining disclosure of
restraints upon normal market forces from whatever source they arise. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 attacks the problem of divergence between theoretical and actual market
price by prohibiting certain purposive activity aimed at producing that divergence. See 46
Yale L. J. 624 (1937).
z4 Matter of South Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1694 (1938).
146See Matter of Austin Silver Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1774 at 7 (I938). But cf. Matter of
Old Diamond Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1576 at i (1937) (held materially misleading for a
registrant to disclose a past competitive market price of 47 . a share and to state that the stock
would be publicly offered at 3o . a share when the registrant did not also disclose that as of the
effective date of the registration statement the competitive market price of its stock was from
30. to 5f. a share). The registrant may not state that securities will be sold by a "step-up"
scheme without disclosing that the sole purpose of the scheme is to stimulate security sales by
giving the underwriter a "buy-now" argument. Matter of Snow Point Mining Co. Inc., x
S.E.C. 311, 318 (1936); Matter of Avocalon Extension Syndicate Ltd., x S.E.C. 657, 659
(1936).
X47Matter of Rickard Ramore Gold Mines, 2 S.E.C. 377, 385 (1934). Cf. Instructions as
to Item ig, Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form, Form A-O-i at4 (1936); Instruc-

tion as to Item 24, Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form, Instruction Book for Form
A-2 at 8 (i937). But the registration statement is not deficient for failure to disclose factors
other than artificial stimuli that may conceivably affect the future market price of the registered security or for failure to discuss the likelihood of those factors assuming importance.
Matter of Queensboro Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. z617 at 3 (1937). And an optimistic,
estimate of future market price, if it is not impossible of realization, and if the conditions precedent to its realization are revealed, will not be held deficient in spite of proof that the
party who made it believed it to be one-third too large. Matter of Ypres Cadillac Mines Ltd.,
Sec. Act Rel. 1652 at 8 (938).
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this general principle the commission has required the registrant, who
states that the registered issue will be offered at the market, to reveal not
only any devices which the registrant has used in the past,4 is presently
using, or intends to use X49 in order to effect alterations in the price of its

securities during their distribution,' s° but, also, any marked deviation of
the market for the registrant's security from the standards of a perfect
market. 5 1
148 Matter of Rickard Ramore Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 377, 384 (1937); Matter of Austin
Silver lining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1774 at 7 (1938). The rule is seemingly applied even though
counsel for the commission has offered no proof that similar devices will be employed in connection with the distribution of the registered securities.
'49 Rule 5o5, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933, at 37 (1938); Matter of
Rickard Ramore Gold Mines Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 377, 384 (i937). But cf. note 147 supra.
Iso Devices coming within the ambit of this rule include: (i) limitations on the supply of the
registered security during its distribution: limitations on deliveries of securities sold, options
to purchase which can be exercised only if the securities purchased are allowed to remain with
the underwriter for a certain period of time, and informal agreements not to sell holdings of the
registered security while it was being distributed (Matter of Rickard Ramore Gold Mines Ltd.,
2 S.E.C. 377, 384 (1937)), restrictions on the amount of registered securities which will be
offered at any one time (Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 3 (I937)),
and agreements to put securities of the kind registered in escrow pending the completion of
distribution of the registered securities (Item 26, Form A-O-i at rS (1936)); even the risk of
limitation of supply by the issuer must be revealed (Matter of West Park Apts. Corp., Sec.
Act Rel. i811 at 8 (1938) (registrant stated that it would offer securities at a minimum price
of $95.1o on a basis of sale to the highest bidders, but failed to disclose that it reserved the
right to refuse any bid in whole or part) ); (2) devices whose efficacy in manipulating or stabilizing the price of securities offered is a consequence of the ignorance of persons dealing in the
stock both of its intrinsic worth and of the existence of price-fixing practices: "matched"
sales, or a plan to "step-up" prices with the aid of supporting bids (Matterof Rickard Ramore
Gold Mines Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 377, 384 (1937)) or other stabilizing or manipulative device (Matter of Austin Silver Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1774 at 7 (1938)). If the issuer or any of the
underwriters has grounds to believe that stabilization is contemplated to facilitate an offering
under the Securities Act, all prospectuses must indicate prominently the intent to stabilize
the securities to be stabilized and the exchanges, if any, upon which the securities will be
stabilized, and must inform the investor that there is no assurance that stabilization operations
will be begun or continued. Rule 827, Sec. Act Rel. 18go (1939). It has been held deficient
to reveal market supporting activity by the underwriter with respect to registered shares
when the registrant implies contrary to fact that the underwriter does not intend to stabilize
all registered shares (Matter of Ypres Cadillac Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. r652 (1938)). The
sale of a security at the market price without disclosing concurrent artificial pressure exerted
on the market price by or for the seller constitutes an omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statement of the offering price by the seller not misleading, and is sufficient to expose the seller to liability under § 17(a) of the Securities Act (Coplin v. United
States, 88 F. (2d) 652, 661 (C.C.A. 9th 1937), cert. denied 301 U.S. 703 (1937); Securities and
Exchange Comm'n v. Otis and Co., 18 F. Supp. io, 102 (Ohio 1936) ).

is, Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 3 (limitation by governmental
action of the number of shares in the market); Matter of Rickard Ramore Gold Mines Ltd.,
2 S.E.C. 377, 384 (1937) (market highly volatile due to small number of buyers and sellers).
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IV. DISCLOSURE OF UNAVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTYDIVERSION OF FUNDS FROM THE ENTERPRISE

Human nature being what it is, the hazard that persons who have the
power to do so will divert funds from corporate purposes to achieve
enrichment disproportionate to the services which they render, would appear to be a hazard as basic as is the risk that fixed assets are valued
improperly. Another endeavor of the commission under the Securities
Act, consequently, has been to isolate the persons with the power to
divert funds from proper corporate uses, and to detect any past diversions and any diversions contemplated in connection with distribution of
the registered issue. The mechanisms by which diversion can be achieved
are doubtless numerous, including, for example, loans to insiders or, more
rarely, loans from insiders at excessive rates of interest, sales of property to
the corporation at profits which would not be realized in arms-length
transactions, and sales of shares of stock to insiders at less than market
price with the intent that the vendees might realize profits from resale
of the stock at the market. The succeeding discussion of disclosure required with respect to stock sales by the corporation at less than market
price illustrates the commission's treatment of these problems.
To understand the import of the items in the forms requiring disclosure
of stock sales by the corporation at unduly favorable prices, some discussion of the mechanism of securities distribution is essential. For this purpose one may designate by the term "initial distribution" the series of
transactions through which the securities pass before becoming the property of persons intending to hold as investors. Transactions by which such
purchasers may later arrange the sale of their shares to the public may be
referred to as "subsequent distribution."
Initial distribution may be effected either by public or private offering.
When an issuer contemplates a public offering, it typically makes an
"underwriting" contract with an investment banker or syndicate. By the
terms of the contract the investment banker may agree to take the entire
issue at a specified price per share and resell it at a higher prices2 or he may

agree to purchase the unsold residue of the issue at a price less than the
price at which the registrant sells the remainder.I S In either event the investment banker may receive, at the expense of the investor, a "spread"
or commission larger in view of the risk assumed than would result if there
were free competition between underwriters.
The commission may be larger than would be fixed by impartial market

forces because it is not determined by competitive bidding, 5 4 or because
1S2

Sen. Rep. No. 1455 at 93 (73d Cong. 2d Sess. 1934).

'53

Id. at io.

'54 Id. at

87.
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the underwriter is under no firm commitment to assume any of the risk of
distribution and can therefore refuse to exercise his underwriting option
unless the prospect of gain appears to him decidedly to exceed his risk of
loss. 15s The danger of excessive underwriting charges is, of course, sub-

stantially greater if the underwriter is in control of the issuer, or if representatives of the underwriter are members of the issuer's board of
xs6
directors
Two kinds of items included in the forms advise the prospective investor as to whether or not a concern in which he is solicited to invest dissipates undue proportions of money invested with it as commissions in the
course of public offerings of its securities. In the first place, on the theory
that practices once indulged in are likely to be repeated, the historical
technique of disclosure is employed, and the registrant is required to
reveal the amount and recipient of any commission paid in the course of
the public offering of any of its outstanding capital stock 5 7 or long term
debts whose primary distribution was effected within a specified period
preceding registration. In the second place, the registrant under all forms
must reveal commissions paid or to be paid to underwriters in connection
with the initial distribution of the registered issue.'1 9 To discover the
broad significance of this second requirement implies examination of the
meaning of the terms which it embodies. "Commission" is used in the
very broad sense of "cash, securities, contracts, or anything else of value
paid, to be set aside, or disposed of, or understandings with or for the
benefit of any other person in which any underwriter is interested."' 6°
"Payment" includes disbursement by any affiliate of the issuer as well as
payment by the issuer.' 6' The term "underwriter" as defined by section
z5SId. at 113.

56Id. at

85.

"'7
Instruction z6, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 31
1, 1922); Item 38, Form A-2 at ro (information for securities issued in the two years preceding registration); Instruction 2 1(b), Financial
Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 49 (1937) (information for securities issued in
ten years preceding registration).
IS$Instruction 17, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-z at
31 (1937) (information for securities issued since Jan. 1, 1922); Item 38, Form A-2 at zo (information for securities issued in the two years preceding registration).
X59
Items 24, 25, Form A-2 at 8 (i937); Item 36, Form A-i at 1I(I937); Item 28(c), Form
E-i at 14 (1937); Items ii, i8, 2o, Form A-o-i at 6, 1o, 11(1936). These items require the
registrant to reveal the total spread between the offering price to the public and the price paid
by the underwriter obtaining the securities on the best terms. Matter of Sweet's Steel Co.
(1937) (information for securities issued since Jan.

Sec. Act Rel. z899 at 6 (1939).
1° Instruction as to Item 24, Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form, Instruction

Book for Form A-2 at i8(1937).
161!bm.
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of the Securities Act is broad enough to include many persons not
ordinarily thought of as underwriters 63 who receive compensation 6 4 which
66
6s
is contingent upon the success of the initial distribution, at least, if
their compensation exceeds the amount which would be fixed by an arms67
length transaction.'
2

(11),

6

The Congressional history of this clause is given in Matter of Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act

12

Rel. 1776 at 8, n. 15 (1938).
6

13

One may be an underwriter whether or not he is in privity of contract with the issuer.

Matter of Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1776 at 9 (1938).
164It is sufficient receipt of compensation if the chief business of the claimed underwriter
is the sale of its own securities and the purchase of the securities of one issuer and its affiliates.
Matter of Unity Gold Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 1776 at 9 (1938). "
16s
"Distribution, although not expressly defined in the act comprises the entire process by
which in the course of a public offering, a block of securities is dispersed and ultimately comes
to rest in the hands of the investing public. See Matter of Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp.,
i S.E.C. 147, 162 (193s). It is a process without finite boundaries and often includes one or
more redistributions by which portions of the issue are repurchased from speculative buyers
and so called weak hands with a view to replacement with permanent investors. See 14
Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 9212." Matter of Oklahoma-Texas Trust, Sec. Act Rel. z563 at 5-6,
(1937), aff'd ioo F.(2d) 888 (C.C.A. ioth 1939).
'6 This definition of underwriter is not exclusive inasmuch as the commission regards as
an underwriter any person who manages the distribution of all or a substantial part of the
registered issue or who performs the normal functions of an underwriting syndicate regardless
of the amount of his compensation. Rule 141 (c), General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act
of 1933 at 3 (1938). The reason for this extension of definition is seemingly to force liability
upon those persons who by virtue of their knowledge and influential role in determining the
character of securities which are offered should be responsible.
167 The proposition that one is inevitably an underwriter if the amount of his compensation
depends upon the success of the distribution of the registered issue appears to follow from a
number of subordinate propositions that appear explicitly in the cases.
These subordinate propositions are: (i) that one who receives compensation for services in
connection with a securities distribution, the amount of which is dependent upon the success
of the distribution, may be an underwriter even though he never purchased any of the registered securities. Matter of Puget Sound Distillery Inc., Sec. Act Rel. X725 (1938) (a "finder,"
or person who obtained an underwriter for the registrant, was held to be an underwriter when
he received extra compensation for having found an underwriter); Matter of Unity Gold Corp.,
Sec. Act Rel. 1776 at 7 (1938) (a person who participates in the profits of an underwriting
may be an underwriter even though he at no time owned any of the securities being distributed).
Matter of Sweet's Steel Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1899 (1939) (in holding a party to be a principal
underwriter, though he only acted as an agent in distributing shares to the public, and though
he only took title to the registrants shares as "collateral security" and as compensation for
services, the commission relied strongly on the fact that the party was to be compensated
with money received by distribution of the registered issue and with registered stock; it was
remarked that "the nature of [the party's] interest is not compatible with that of a mere
lender of money or a person performing a normal banking function. [It was] sharing the profits
and risks of distribution"). See Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines, 2 S.E.C. 226, 248
(1937). See also H.R. Rep. No. 85 at 13 ( 7 3d Cong. ist. Sess. 1933). (2) that one who purchases and resells the registered security in large quantities is an underwriter. H.R. Rep. No.
85 at 13 (7 3 d. Cong. ist Sess. 1933). See Matter of Kinner Airplane and Motor Corp Ltd.,
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By virtue of items in the registration forms the investor is therefore
afforded in every prospectus a prominent tabular summary of discounts
or commissions which have been or are contemplated to be given in connection with the distribution of the registered issue, and a list of the
persons who have received such amounts. Such information assumes additional significance when coupled with the required enumeration of
underwriters under common control with the issuer. 65
The primary distribution of securities may also involve a so-called
private offering or preferred list. Under this scheme the issuer selects certain prominent persons to whom the security is offered at prices less than
the price at which the security is offered to the public. The good-will of
persons on the preferred list is thereby cultivated since they can resell on
the market at a profit. 6 9 The Securities Act does not require a registration
statement to be effective before an issuer can legitimately make a solely
private offering. 70 In the event, however, that a portion of the issuer's
securities is publicly offered, the registrant is required to disclose the
persons or classes of persons to whom the registrant proposes to sell registered securities at prices different from the public offering price and the
consideration to be received from such persons. 1 In these circumstances
Sec. Act Rel. 1644 at 3 (1937) (the additional fact in that case that the underwriter was a
director of the registrant is immaterial. Cf. Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines, 2 S.E.C.
226, 247 (1937)). (3) that one who has a contract right to purchase and resell the registered
issue on a commission basis is an underwriter (Matter of Nat'l Boston Montana Mines,
2 S.E.C. 226, 247-8 (1937) ), even though at the effective date of the registration statement he
was under no firm committment to effect the distribution (Matter of Livingston Mining Co.,
2 S.E.C. 141, 148 (1937); Instruction as to Item 22, Instructions as to Particular Items of the
Form, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at x8 (1937). See also Matter of Bering Straits Tin Mines,
Sec. Act Rel. 1368 at 7 (1937))The circumstances in which a person has been held not to be an underwriter within the
meaning of the Securities Act emphasize the validity of the general proposition. Thus in
Matter of South Umpqua Mining Co., Sec. Act Rel. 1694 (1938) it was held that a finder is
not an underwriter because from a showing that one received a fixed fee as compensation for
his efforts in seeking an underwriter it does not follow that he participated either directly or
indirectly in the distribution or in the profits of the distribution. Rule 142, General Rules and
Regulations, Sec. Act Rels. 186i and 1862 (1938) provides that one is not an underwriter who
purchases a security for investment and not for commission upon resale, and who is not under
common control or management with the issuer or with the principal underwriter.
x6S Item 28(b), Form E-i at 14 (1937); Item 22, Form A-2 at 8 (i937); Item 32, Form A-i
at ii (ig37); Item iS(e), Form A-O-I at 9 (1936).
269Sen. Rep. op. cit. supranote 152, at io6.
X70See Securities Act of 1933 at § 4 (1); Rule 152, General Rules and Regulations, Securities
Act of 1933, at 4 (1938).
X71Item 35, Form A-i at 11 (1937); Item 26, Form A-2 at 8 (1937); for an extreme interpretation of these items see Matter of West Park Apts. Corp., Sec. Act Rel. 18ri at

(1938).

s,

n. ii
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the investor may determine for himself whether the corporation received
consideration warranting the preferential treatment.
"Subsequent distribution" may be accompanied by some or all of the
evils which were noted above in connection with primary distribution
through public offerings.172 If, however, the shares are owned by a person

who originally acquired them for investment and who is not in control of
the issuer, it would be unduly burdensome to require registration before
even a public offering; the holder would not be in a position to cause the
issuer to register. Accordingly, such sales are exempted as "transactions
by any other person other than the issuer, underwriter, or dealer."' 73 But
where the holder, by reason of affiliation with the issuer, is in a position to
cause the securities to be registered, any person who sells the securities for
him or buys them with a view to their resale is included within the definition of "underwriter.'1 74 The securities must therefore be registered and
the compensation of any such "underwriter" disclosed.
The techniques available under the Securities Act are, of course, of
limited effectiveness in dealing with the hazard of diversion of corporate
funds through excessive underwriting fees. Such techniques are to be contrasted with that recently adopted pursuant to the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. The commission's Rule U-I2F-2, adopted over the dissent
of Commissioner Mathews, prohibits the payment of underwriting fees to
affiliates or to "any person whom the commission finds stands in such
relation to [the corporation] that there is liable to be ....an absence of

arm's-length bargaining," unless it appears to the commission that "appropriate and diligent effort was made to obtain competitive bids for the
securities" or that "such effort was not practicable" and that "the remu7. 5
neration is reasonable."'
V. DISCLOSURE OF AVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTIES

A second type of uncertainty which may be present in a business enterprise may be denominated avoidable uncertainty. By avoidable uncertainty is meant any risk which confronts one investing in an enterprise and
which is neither a necessary consequence of industrial organization nor a
risk inherent in human nature. Such risks often result from pre-existing
contracts or arrangements as to corporate structure, the effect of which
cannot be determined with certainty. Two types of such sources of uncertainty are discussed below, option contracts and holding company struc172

Notes x54, 155 and I56 supra.

Rep. No. 85 at 13 (73d Cong. ist Sess. 1933).
175 Holding Co. Act Rel. i38o (i938).
X74H.R.

X73Note 170 supra.
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tures. It is a striking paradox that the risks which constitute avoidable
obstructions to the perfect mobility of investors and to their freedom to
contract arise from legal relations affecting the business enterprise, which
vested as a consequence of the prior exercise by other persons of their
power to contract freely.
A. RISKS ARISING FROM OUTSTANDING OPTIONS

An illustration will clarify the nature of the type of uncertainty arising
from option contracts to which the registrant is a party. Suppose that a
corporation has issued i,ooo shares of preferred stock with a par value of
$ioo each, that on liquidation of the corporation holders of preferred
shares are entitled to preference of $120 per share, and that holders have
the option at any time to exchange each share of preferred for five shares
of common. Under these circumstances how should the liquidation and
conversion rights be set forth and how is the effect of these provisions to
be evaluated, for example, by a prospective purchaser of an additional
issue of common stock? It is obvious that the balance sheet technique is
of little help in this connection. A liquidation preference which exceeds
the consideration received for preferred shares can usually be shown only
parenthetically, and the significance of the item is almost entirely speculative since the likelihood of liquidation, voluntary or involuntary, can
seldom be estimated.
In view of these and other contingencies arising out of investment contracts, the commission requires that the issuer reveal not only the par or
stated value of stock and the maturity value of long term obligations
which the registrant has issued or is issuing under the registration statement, but also the rights and liabilities evidenced under different contingencies by all of the registrant's securities outstanding or to be offered
under the registration statement,16 and the number and nature of all such
'76 Capital Stock: Item z6, Form A-i at 3 (9.37); Item 53, Form A-i at 19 (1937); Item 53,
Form A-O-i at 31 (1936); Item 54, Form A-O-z at 32 (1936); Items 16, 17, 19, Form A-2 at 7
(1937); Item ii(a)(b), Form E-i at 9 (i937); Item 13, Form E-i at 1o (1937). Accounting Rel.
9 (1938) states that in the opinion of the Commission's chief accountant the preferences on
involuntary liquidation in excess of the par or stated value of preferred or any other senior
class of stock should be disclosed, preferably in the balance sheet, and that when the excess is
significant, there should be shown in the balance sheet or in the footnotes thereto the difference
between the aggregate preference on involuntary liquidation and the aggregate par or stated
value, and a statement as to any restrictions on surplus arising from this fact; in the event that
the total of liquidation preference and dividend arrears of any senior class of stock exceeds
the sum of the par or stated value of the junior capital and of surplus, the registrant must also
disclose this fact in the balance sheet or by footnote to the balance sheet. Form A-2 requires
balance sheets to disclose arrears in cumulative dividends, Note B, Instruction Book for Form
A-2 at 35 (1937)- In Matter of Lewis American Airways Inc., i S.E.C. 330, 343 (1936) it was
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securities which the registrant is authorized to issue subsequent to completion of the distribution of the registered issue. 77 The registrant must
also disclose any provisions for funds necessary to meet liabilities to
existing investors171 and any default in making additions to such funds
179
under such provisions.
The option contract is thus an important source of avoidable risk. The
registrant may grant options which are embodied in the securities it
sells, 18° or it may grant options to purchase securities.' 8 ' The strict standards of disclosing the consequences of these options which the commission may uphold are suggested by the disclosure which the commission
deems essential when the registrant is the owner, at the effective date of
the registration statement, of a lease and option to purchase a mining
claim. Such a registrant is required to disclose in a footnote to the balance
sheet or elsewhere any assets that it would lose if remaining payments under the lease and option agreement were not made. 8 2 In addition, the
registrant may not set up balance sheet entries which would indicate that
the fee in the property held under lease and option had passed to the
registrant, with the remainder due under the option treated as a simple
held that the registrant must divulge any charter provisions forbidding cumulating voting.
Funded Debt: Items 14, 15, Form A-2 at 6 (1937); Items 11, 12, 13, 14, Form E-i at 9-io
(x937); Item 23, Form A-i at 7 (1937); Item 54, Form A-O-i at 32 (1936). Other Securities:
Items 18, ig, Form A-2 at 7 (1937); Items 12, 13, Form E-x at 10 (1937); Item 54 Form A-O-x
at32 (1936).
177 CapitalStock: Instruction 16A, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer,
Form A-i at 31 (1937); Item 20, Form A-i at 5 (1937); Item 52, Form A-O-i at3o (1936);

Schedule V, Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at io (1936); Instruction 21, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 49 (1937); Item 9, Form E-i at 7 (N937);Items io,
13, Form E-i at 8, 1o (1937). Funded Debt:Item 9, cols. A to D, Form A-2 at 2 (1937); Schedule
X, cols. A to E, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 49 (I937); Schedule XI, cols. A to E, In-

struction Book for Form A-2 at 5o (i937); Item 21, Form A-i at 6 (1937); Item

22,

Form A-z

at 7 (1937); Items io, 13, Form E-i at 8, 10 (1937); Item 52, Form A-O-i at 3o (1936). Other
Securities: Item xo(b), Form E-i at 8 (1937); Items 11, 12, 13, Form A-2 at 4, 5, 6 (1937);
Item 52, Form A-O-i at 30 (1937).
178 Item 23, Form A-i at 7 (1937); Item 13, Form E-i at 10 (i937); Items 14, 15, 16, 17,
Form A-2 at 6-7 (1937); Items 53, 54, Form A-O-i at 31, 32 (1936).
X79Note C, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 35 (1937). This data must be furnished
whether or not specifically required by the form. Matter of Oklahoma Hotel Bldg. Corp.,

Sec. Act Rel. 1900 (i939).
ISONote 176 supra.
18,Item 56, Form A-O-i at 32 (1936); Item 39, Form A-2 at io (x937). Item 38, Form E-i
at 16 (ig37); Item 25, Form A-i at 7 (I937).
182 Matter of.Canusa Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act Rel. 1507 at 7 (I937). Cf. Schedule IV, 2,
Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at 9-io (936).
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debt.18 3 Since the registrant which holds an option has the legal power to
determine the consequences of the option contract, these results can only
be justified on the ground that that unavoidable economic uncertainty
which faces every registrant may be displaced by the certainty of inadequate quick assets.'5 4 If the rule of these cases is that, when the registrant
is a party to an option contract, it must disclose the potential consequences of the contract most unfavorable to the registrant, it certainly
should be applied afortiori when the party with whom the registrant has
contracted is the optionee with legal power to determine the consequences
of the contract. 8 S
B. RISKS ARISING FROM HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURES

The second species of avoidable uncertainty, which the commission
requires the registrant to reveal, consists of uncertainties arising from the
structure of corporate enterprise. Assume for example that the registrant
is a holding company with two subsidiaries and that a majority of the
voting stock in the holding company is owned by another holding company which has four subsidiaries aside from the registrant and its subsidiaries. Assume further that the controlling interests in the top holding
company in the system are honestly concerned entirely with the advancement of the business interests represented by the top holding company and
its seven subsidiaries. To advance the business interests of the entire
system it may be to the interest of the top holding company to divert
funds from the registrant and/or its subsidiary regardless of, or even contrary to, the best interests of the business enterprise composed of the
183Matter of Franco Mining Co., i S.E.C. 285, 289 (z936); Matter of American Terminals
and Transit Co., i S.E.C. 701, 707-708 (1936); Matter of Canusa Gold Mines Ltd., Sec. Act
Rel. 1507 at 7 (1937). See Matter of Paper Sales Co. of Detroit, Sec. Act Rel. 1556 (1937) as
amended by Sec. Act Rel. i665 (1938).
184 The reader may perceive the suggestion of a principle of conservatism traceable in the
rule which has just been discussed, the rule as to the measure of cost of fixed assets (p. 411
supra), and the rule that income may not be taken until realized (p. 420 supra). If the commission does consistently follow the principle of conservatism which is said in Graham and
Katz, op. cit. supra note 54 at § 1o3 (ist ed. 1932) to be one of the root principles of orthodox
accounting practice, it would appear to have unconsciously encroached upon its important
basic principles of requiring disclosure of known facts and of areas of doubt. The effect of the
principle of conservatism is to mislead investors e.g., in the situation where two concerns have
substantially the same financial prospects assuming that all contingencies reasonably to be
anticipated as affecting the concerns turn out most unfavorably, and where their financial
prospects are vastly different assuming contingencies anticipated as affecting the concerns
turn out favorably.
US Cf. Matter of Bankers Union Life Co., 2 S.E.C. 63, 68 (x937) with Matter of Haddam
Distillers Corp., i S.E.C. 48, 52 (1934), and with Matter of Bering Straits Tin Mines Inc., Sec.
Act Rel. 1498 at 9 (1937).
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registrant and its subsidiaries. The inevitable consequence is that the investor in the registrant is exposed to a risk of diversion of funds from the
system including the registrant and its subsidiaries on whose financial
welfare the welfare of the investor entirely depends, a risk which arises
from the fact that the business interests of that system may be in conflict
with those of the larger system of which it is a part. 86 This risk is therefore inherent when investment is made in a subsidiary of a holding company, and may be abolished only by either abolishing holding companies
or by preventing holding company subsidiaries from selling securities.
The commission, of course, has no power to require either of these
courses of action under the Securities Act of 1933. In carrying out its
policy of requiring the disclosure of data in a mode without tendency to
misinform,5 7 it must confine itself to enabling the investor to pierce the
artificialities of corporate form to understand the enterprise in which he is
asked to invest. So the commission can and does insist on the one hand
that the registrant must disclose all corporations which are under common
control with the registrant, and any available data with respect to trans8
actions by virtue of which any such corporation has siphoned funds to1 1

or away 8 9 from the .system which includes the registrant and its subsidiaries; and on the other hand that there be full disclosure with respect
to the business condition of the registrant and its subsidiaries, since it is in
the success of this system that the investor has a legal interest.
6
x8
Whenever one person serves two masters whose interests are conflicting, each master
faces the risk that his servant will not serve his interests. The commission requires disclosure
of conflicting interests of persons who control or benefit from disposition of corporate funds.
See e.g., note i68 supra. Conflicts of interest can only be dealt with effectively by prohibiting
persons from assuming incompatible functions. See 49 Stat. 891 (1934), is U.S.C.A. § 78k
(Supp. 1938); Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 216 (r938).
8
X 7 Pp. 402-7 sWprM.
188This might conceivably be done as part of a scheme to improve the registrant's apparent

business condition in order to stimulate its sales of stock during the period of securities distribution. Cf. Sen. Rep. No. 1455 at 382 (73 d Cong. 2d Sess. I934): "The primary motivation
of the organization of the holding company has now become the development and financial
promotion of security selling schemes. The holding company per se has become the most important unit, and the industry or operating companies merely tools or instrumentalities of
financial promotion and security speculation."
189The prejudicial effect on the investor in a subsidiary of a so-called "upstream" diversion
to a parent of the subsidiary is obvious. But a downstream loan may also be prejudicial Suppose for example that the A holding company owns 51% of the one class of stock of the B company and 49% of the one class of stock of the C company, that the B company owns 51% of the
stock of the C company, and that the A company uses its voting power in the B company to
shift $iooooo from the B company to the C company. The effect of this transaction will be to
increase the equity of the A company in the $Sooooofrom $5i,ooo to $77,oro and to decrease
the equity of minority stockholders in the B company by $26,oo.

COMMENT

The commission requires disclosure of intercompany transactions within an enterprise composed of the registrant corporation and of all its
affiliates. The registrant consequently must segregate and reveal current'90 or long term19 ' loans made by it' 92 or by one of its subsidiaries' 93 to
parents of the registrant or to persons under common control with the
registrant, as well as loans made by the registrant to any of its subsidiaries.' 94 Conversely, the registrant is required to segregate and disclose
current 9 s and long term 9 6 loans by affiliates to the registrant' 97 and to its
subsidiaries.'1 8
One method by which funds may be diverted away from or to the
system composed of the registrant and its subsidiaries is by sale of property to the registrant 99 or to a subsidiary 2° ° at other than the going market
rates. If any affiliate acquired property not more than two years before
the resale to the registrant or to one of its subsidiaries, all forms require that
the registrant reveal the cost of the property to the affiliate.20 Some forms
Igo Instruction 24 for Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 34
(i937); Instruction r7, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 48 (z937);
Instruction 20, Instructions Relative to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 32 (3937).
191Schedules X, XI, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 49, 50 (1937) (applies only to funded

debt).
192Item 54, Form A-i at 20 (I937); Item 49, Form E-i at xg (1937); Exhibits P, R and S,
Form E-i at 22 (1937); Special Rules 5B2(a), 5B3(a) and cf. SBi(a), Instruction Book for
Form A-2 at 6, 8, 9 (1937); Instruction i, Instructions as to Financial Statements Instruction
Book for Form A-2 at22 (1937).
193Item 50, Form E-i at i9 (1937); Exhibit V, Form E-i at 23 (1937); Special Rules 5Bi(c),
5B2(d) and 5B3(c), Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 7, 8, 9, (1937); Instruction i, Instructions
as to Financial Statements Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 22 (i937).
'94 Instruction 24, Instructions as to Balance Sheets, Instruction Book for Form A-2
at 34 (i937); Instruction 17, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 48
(1937); Instruction 20, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i

at 32 (i937); Schedules X, XI, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 49, 50 (1937) (applies only
to funded debt).
'95 Instruction 24, Instructions as to Balance Sheets, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 34
(937); Instruction 13, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-z at
31 (i937); Instruction 17, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. r, Form E-i at 48 (1937).

96Instruction 27, Instructions as to Balance Sheets, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at
34 (937); Instruction 18, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at
31 (i937); Instruction ig, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 48 (i937).
'97Note 192 suptra.

1gSNote 193 supra.

99 Items 26

and 27, Form E-i at 13, 14 (1937); Special Rules 5B2(a), SB.3(a) and cf. 5Bi(a),
Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 6, 8, 9 (1937); Instruction i, Instructions as to Financial
Statements Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 22-3 (937).
20 Note 193 supra.
20' Items 26(a)(6), 26(b)( 4 ), and 27, Form E-i at z3, 14 (i937); Schedule II, note 3, and
Schedule IV; note 2, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 41,43 (1937)-
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have more stringent provisions to insure disclosure of profits or losses to
20 2
affiliates of the registrant on such sales of property.
A third way in which the commission throws light on diversion of funds
to or from the registrant is by requiring the disclosure of commissions paid
to affiliates of the registrant on the sale of long term obligationse3
or
6
°s
capital stock2°4 of the registrant or of its subsidiaries.20
If the investor is to have any basis of comparing the registrant's rate of
profit with the rate of profit of other concerns, the registrant must publish
an accurate statement of income. The registrant is consequently called
°
°
upon to segregate gross sales to afflliates 7 and dividends from affaliate2 S

from income which was received at arms-length, and which was therefore
assuredly legitimate income, and not the product of a bookkeeping device.
Since the investor is interested financially only in the enterprise composed of the registrant and its subsidiaries, the registrant must include in
the registration statement balance sheets of the registrant and of its subsidiaries and in general need include no others,209 and must describe the

plants and equipmentio and any material franchises and concessionsel
owned by its subsidiaries, and the business of its subsidiariesx2 insofar as
they are "materially important to the total enterprise represented by the
registrant and its subsidiaries."
202Instruction io(b), Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 46 (1937);
Instruction 6B, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at 30 (i937);
Item 44,Form A-i at 15 (1937).

203
Instruction 17, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at
3' ('937).
204 Instruction i6, Instructions Pertaining to Balance Sheets of the Issuer, Form A-i at
31 ('937).
26 Note 193 supra.
Instruction i, Instructions Relative to Profit and Loss Statements, Form A-i at 33
(i937); Instruction i, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. 2, Form E-i at 5i (r937);
Instruction iA, Instructions Relative to Profit and Loss Statements, Instruction Book for
Form A-2 at36 (i937).
20s Schedule IX, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 48 (1937); Instruction 5,Instructions
Relative to Profit and Loss Statement, Form A-i at 33 (i937); Instruction 5,Financial Statement Instruction Set No. 2, Form E-i at 5i (1937).
209
Instruction i,Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form A-2
at 22 (1937); Item 5o, Form E-i at ig (i937); Item 56, Form A-i at 28 (i937).
-0 Instruction as to Item 7, Instructions as to the Particular Items of the Form, Instruction
Book for Form A-2 at i6 (i937).
' Instruction as to Item 8, Instructions as to the Particular Items of the Form, Instruction
Book for Form A-2 at 16 (i937).
- Instructions as to Items 5 and 6, Instructions as to the Particular Items of the Form,
20s

Note 192 supra.
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Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 16 (i93 7).

COMMENT

The modes in which the forms qualify the general conception that the
enterprise, in the financial success of which the investor is interested,
includes the registrant and its subsidiaries tend more to emphasize than
to restrict the general validity of the conception of the enterprise as
including the registrant and its subsidiaries13 Apparent exceptions in
favor of requiring financial statements in circumstances in which the registrant does not have control of the corporation whose financial status is
sought to be revealed all relate to corporations whose securities or assets
are to be acquired and arise from the commission's recognitionl4 of the
importance of the investor's having a picture of the financial conditions
after the sale of the registered issue has been effected and its proceeds used
as proposed.21-

The forms are not uniform as to whether or not the concept of the enterprise as including the registrant and its subsidiaries should include only
those subsidiaries in which the registrant has impregnable 6 control by
virtue of ownership of 50% or more of the voting stock,21 7 or whether the
concept of the enterprise should include the registrant and any other
X8
corporations which it actually controls.2

Within the limits of the enterprise composed of the registrant and its
subsidiaries, there remains the problem of presenting the financial condition of the group in such manner as to emphasize diversities as well as
unities within the system. There is, of course, no reason for supposing
that every system of a registrant and subsidiaries approximates a maximum of productive efficiency. The system may have been "too big too
long"

219

it may include unprofitable or less profitable elements that

should be eliminated or again it may not be functionally integrated for
213Instruction

i(c), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form A-2

at 22 (I937). Cf. Instruction as to Item 4(a), Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form,
Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 14 (i937); Instruction 8, Instructions as to Preparing Form

E-r, Instruction Book for Form E-i at 5 (1937). Instruction 4(I)(3), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instructions for Form A-2 at 26 (1937).
214 Pp. 422-24 supra.
21SInstruction 2b(ii), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form
A-2 at 24 (1937); Item 46, Form E-i at i8 (1937).
216Except as affected by events of default.
217

Item So, Form E-i at 19 (1937); Exhibit V, Form E-x at 23 (i937). Instruction i(a)(b)-

(c), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 22 (1937);
Instruction 3 (b), Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 24 (1937). Even under these forms, however, the registrant is required to disclose the structure of the registrant and all its subsidiaries.
Item 24, Form E-i at 12 (1937); Item 4(a), Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 14 (1937).
=8 Item 56, Form A-i at 28 (1937).
219

See 17 Fortune No. 3 at 69 (1938); 17 Fortune No. 4 at 63 (r938).
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productive purposes.220 The commission has adopted few rules with respect to the proper mode of presenting the relationship of the parts of the
"enterprise" to the whole. Of most general significance are the views that
the purpose of the consolidated balance sheet is to reflect the financial
condition of a parent company and its subsidiaries as if they were a single
organization,~' and that consequently the registrant must follow that
principle of inclusion or exclusion in consolidating statements of subsidiaries with its own statements, which in the opinion of its officers will
most dearly exhibit the financial condition and results of operations.- A
few more definite requirements, however, have been imposed. Although
the forms are not uniform as to whether or not the registrant must file reports of subsidiaries that it controls with less than 50% ownership of
stock, no statement of a subsidiary may be consolidated with a statement
of the registrant unless the registrant has unshakable contro223 over the
subsidiary because of its possession of over 50% of the voting power in
the subsidiary.22 4 If, by virtue of this rule or of the general rule as to
consolidation, the registrant may not consolidate the statement of a subsidiary with its own, it must segregate and disclose any earnings of the
unconsolidated subsidiaries accrued on the books of the registrant but
not realized by the registrant.- 5 A balance sheet consolidating the accounts of the registrant and of one or more of its subsidiaries must substitute the parent's actual equities in the subsidiaries' net assets for its
220

Cf.49 Stat. 820 (1935), z5 U.S.C.A. § 79 k (Supp. 1938).

22,Accounting Rel. 3 (1938).
-2 Instruction z, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. 3,Form E-I at 52 (1937); Instruction 3 (b), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 24
(1937). But Form A-i merely requires the issuer to state the guiding principle followed in
consolidating accounts. Item 56, Form A-i at 28 (1937). The principles of consolidation
followed by the registrant must be stated. Accounting Rel. 7 at 3 (1938)223 Note 215 supra.
224

Instruction 3(b), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for Form

A-2 at 24 (1937); Item 5o, Form E-i at ig (1937). But there is no such requirement in Form
A-I (1937).
"25Instruction 6(a), Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-i at 45 (1937);
Instruction 24, Financial Statement Instruction Set No. i, Form E-r at 49 (i937). But Forms
A-i and A-2 require this separate statement only with respect to income reflected in the profit
and loss statements of the issuer in the period for which profit and loss statements are furnished. Instruction 25, Instructions Relative to Profit and Loss Statements, Form A-i at
32 (1937); Instruction 3 (b), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for
Form A-2 at 25 (1937). Form A-2, however, requires the registrant to reveal in the con-

solidated balance sheet the extent to which the equity of the registrant in any of its unconsolidated subsidiaries has been increased or decreased since the date of acquisition of such
subsidiary. Instruction
Form A-2 at 25 (1937).

3

(b), Instructions as to Financial Statements, Instruction Book for

COMMENT

investments in subsidiaries2 6 and must state separately minority interest
in the capital and surplus of subsidiaries consolidated.227 In addition,
intercompany profit and losses must be eliminated in the consolidated
8
profit and loss statement insofar as is possible.22
The prior discussion has been of the static concept of the enterprise
developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. As an outgrowth
of this static concept, the commission is apparently developing a temporal
concept of the enterprise which differentiates the length of time spanning
the incorporation and dissolution of the registrant corporation from the
period of existence of the business enterprise.
In the first place if the registrant was organized to take over a preexisting business and if the organization which carried on that business
was under common control with the registrant, the commission appears to
require the same disclosure with respect to the registrant's predecessor
as with respect to the registrant. Thus, in the recent case of Matter of
Breeze Corporation,-9one M controlled company C which sold its assets
including patents to company B, also controlled by M, in return for stock
of company B. At or about the time of this sale, the patents sold were
written up in accordance with an appraisal by L. The evidence was inconclusive as to whether L was acting for company C before the sale or
for company B after the sale. L was a patent lawyer and an engineer, but
he neither was nor held himself out to be an accountant. L knew nothing
of company B's manufacturing costs or financial condition and made no
independent investigation or special study of the value of the patents.
He calculated the value of the patents by assuming a certain sales volume
for io years, and by calculating an "actual value of the patents on a
royalty basis" at a certain percentage of such sales. This "actual value"
exceeded the cost of the patents to company C. During the ensuing ten
years, the sales volume never reached that which L had assumed, but the
balance sheet of company B nevertheless continued to show the patents
at the values assigned to them by L. Such value was described as "cost
based on book value assigned by B's predecessor." As grounds for their
226Accounting Rel. 3 (1937).
227 Accounting Rel. 7 at 3 (1938); Instruction
3 (b), Instructions as to Financial Statements,
Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 24 (1937); Instruction 2, Financial Statement Instruction
Set No. 3, Form E-i at 52 (1937).
8
22 Accounting Rel. No. 7 at 3 (1938); Instruction 3 (b), Instructions as to Financial State-

ments, Instruction Book for Form A-2 at 25 (1937); Instruction 3, Financial Statement
Instruction Set No. 3, Form E-i at 52 (1937); but Form A-i merely requires the registrant to
furnish a statement showing all eliminations of intercompany items.
229Sec. Act Rel. 1786 at 14 (1938).
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decision that it was materially misleading for the registrant to fail to disdose the write-up by L and the circumstances casting doubt upon its
soundness, the commissioners made a finding that the business of company B was a "continuation" of that of company C, and argued that the
significant thing to the investor was the cost of the assets to the enterprise
as distinguished from their cost to the corporation registering.
The principle of this case may be that, if a first corporation succeeds
to any fixed asset theretofore owned by a second corporation under common control with the first corporation, the first corporation can place no
balance sheet valuation upon the fixed asset which the second corporation
could not have placed upon the asset. Or the rule conceivably is that
when one corporation under common control with another corporation
acquires a fixed asset of the latter, the former corporation must disclose
the cost of the asset to itself and the cost of the asset to its predecessor.
Either principle is consistent with the concept that the life of the enterprise is co-extensive with the time span of the functional business in
which the registrant is engaged for such time as that business has been
under a single control. Either principle is inconsistent with any identification of the life of the enterprise with the corporate life of the registrant.
What slight evidence appears from the forms confirms the conclusion
that the commission is interested in transactions during the past life of
the same functional business under the same control rather than in transactions during the past life of the corporation endeavoring to register.
The registrant which employs Form A-2, for example, must furnish the
historical financial information required by item 45230 not only as to its
own balance sheet accounts, but also must where practicable give a historical analysis of the accounts of any corporation which was under substantially the same control as the registrant at a time when the registrant
succeeded to all or a substantial portion of the corporation's assets. 23'
Form A-O-i goes even further inasmuch as thirteen items in the form must
be answered with respect to any corporation which the registrant was
organized to take over, whether or not the corporation whose business
was assumed was under common control with the issuer at the date of
transfer.F
230

Form A-2 at ii (x937).
as to Item 45, Instructions as to Particular Items of the Form, Instruction

231 Instructions

Book for Form A-2 at 21 (i937).
2-

Instructions as to Items 3 to 14 inclusive, Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at

2

(1936).

Bit cf. Rule as to use of Form A-O-i, Instruction Book for Form A-O-i at i (1936). Cf. Rules
2, 3, 4, Special Rules as to the Use of Form A-2 for Corporations, Instruction Book for Form

A-2 at 2-io (1937).

COMMENT

On the other hand, that one form does not require historical financial
data is not essential with respect to a period in the history of the registrant
corporation at a time when its business and possibly its management and
control 233 were substantially different at the date of registration.234
C. SUAMMRY-AVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY

The foregoing survey of the experience of the commission suggests that
even the most elaborate disclosure will fail to enable investors to understand the structures of enterprise in which they are solicited to invest.
It may be that, unless some limits are placed upon the complexity of corporate structures and the types of securities which may be sold, the hope
may be largely illusory that competition for investment funds can operate
in substantial measure to direct the flow of capital into enterprises which
are most productive.
Even if it were assumed that investors can and do understand the structures of business enterprises in spite of their legal complexities, the fact
remains that if a business grants options to outsiders, or if a holding company subsidiary issues securities, risks are introduced into the structure
of the enterprise which no disclosure can dispel. Only legislation which
prohibits the issuance of conversion rights to preferred stockholders can
ward off the risk which common stockholders may face through dilution
of voting power or less frequently through dilution of equity. Similarly
only regulatory measures abolishing the issuance of securities by subsidiaries can remove the risk that a top holding company acting in the
financial interest of the holding company and of all its subsidiaries, will
divert funds from a subsidiary upon whose economic welfare some investors are entirely dependent.
VI. CONCLUSION
If economic theory stemming from Adam Smith, that is an analysis of
the operation of a competitive, free enterprise system of organization,
is thought to furnish a blueprint of the good society, social engineering is
necessary to promote conformity to the blueprint. One important reason
for the divergence between actual conditions and those visualized by proponents of such theory is the lack of mobility of persons performing functions in existing economic societies. The central policy of the Securities
Act is to encroach upon the lack of mobility of capital by securing the full
233Financial Statements prior to Discharge in Bankruptcy, Form A-i at 28A (1937).
234 Financial Statements in the Event of Change in Stock Ownership, Property and Business, Form A-i at 28A (i937).
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information of persons supplying funds to business enterprises. Full information not only implies information as to all matters that may reasonably be kiiown with reference to any business enterprise seeking new
funds; its other facet is the full disclosure of risks inherent in the enterprise seeking funds.
The discussion traced the Securities and Exchange Commission's use
of the techniques of standardized money valuation, abandonment of
money valuation, historical financial, and supplementary information as
media of disclosure of risks. The attempt was made to differentiate between those risks which are unavoidable and those risks which are avoidable to bring into sharp focus the contrast between human inability to
handle problems of imperfect mobility arising from unavoidable risk by
any technique other than as-perfect-as-possible disclosure, and the inability of the technique of disclosure to eliminate those uncertainties
which are avoidable. The problem of valuing fixed assets presents the
extreme situation in which the best that can be done is to bring all techniques of disclosure to bear upon the problem of valuing uncertainty.
Evaluation of risks arising from arrangements made prior to the date at
which the investor is solicited to invest presents the other extreme situation in which disclosure can only make persons aware of the risk whereas
other forms of regulation might remove the risk. The risk of diversion
of funds from the enterprise presents in some sense an intermediate
problem. Presumably disclosure will to some extent deter persons from
engaging in such diversion. As to many types of diversion, however, other
sanctions may be necessary to supplement the general rules of the common
law governing the legal position of business fiduciaries.232- Cf. § i6 of the Securities Exchange Act and §§ 12 and 13 of Title I of the Holding

Company Act.

